Clase sobre el coronavirus, por el profesor de filosofía de la Ciencia y la Técnica, Lino Camprubí, desde la Universidad de Sevilla

Escuela de Filosofía de Oviedo, Lección de Carlos Madrid casado en la sede de la Fundación Gustavo Bueno sobre la Teoría del Cierre Categorial aplicada a las diversas “Filosofías de la Física”. Un desarrollo para el análisis y la crítica propuesto desde el sistema forjado por Gustavo Bueno(2024-2016), se trata del Materialismo Filosófico

http://fgbueno.es/act/efo214.htm

David Alvargonzález, Biólogo y filósofo, profesor de la Universidad de Oviedo y autor de varios libros y artículos, nos ofrece este riquísimo artículo sobre un tema CLAVE del sistema del Materialismo Filosófico, aunque agrega algunas cuestiones , con el fin de delimitar con mayor precisión cualquier posible resquicio que algunos estudiosos del Materialismo Filosófico, o público interesado en la Teoría de la Ciencia(Teoría del Cierre Categoral) pudieran considerar de su interés y del interesara los estudios de las Ciencias y de la Filosofía Materialista


La idea de cierre categorial. Intervención en Santo Domingo de la Calzada el día 15 de marzo de 2019 con motivo de la presentación del número 175 de la revista 
Berceo dedicada a Gustavo Bueno

AUTOR: David Alvargonzález

Introducción

En esta exposición voy a intentar presentar la idea de cierre categorial del filósofo Gustavo Bueno (1924.2016). Para ello voy a explicar brevemente cuáles son los contenidos centrales de esa teoría y, a continuación, reivindicaré la importancia que puede tener para cualquier filosofía del presente. Gustavo Bueno es un filósofo español que tiene decenas de miles de seguidores en Internet y que, en Google Académico, tiene un valor treinta para el índice h. La teoría del cierre categorial es una de las partes más originales y nucleares de la filosofía de Bueno, y es de esperar que la importancia de esta teoría vaya en aumento, aunque solo sea a efectos polémicos, porque la idea de ciencia es relevante para cualquier sistema filosófico del presente y del futuro, como voy a tratar de mostrar. La teoría del cierre categorial es una rectificación de la teoría de las categorías de Aristóteles y supone establecer una conexión interna entre la ontología y la filosofía de la ciencia, entre las categorías ontológicas y los campos de las ciencias.

Es una idea temprana y nuclear de la filosofía de Bueno, pero también de cualquier filosofía del presente que se precie ya que es una idea que tiene que ver con la verdad científica: es un intento de determinar qué es la verdad científica, en qué se diferencia la verdad científica de las verdades del sentido común, y qué es una ciencia. Este es un asunto central desde el origen de la filosofía, pues ya Platón y Aristóteles estaban discutiendo, precisamente, qué era la geometría. En la época moderna también se discutió profusamente acerca de lo que es una ciencia, y se sigue discutiendo en la actualidad. Las verdades científicas son el tipo de verdades más sólidas que tenemos, y sobre las que hay que construir cualquier sistema filosófico del presente y del futuro, ya que es imposible hacer un sistema filosófico de espaldas a las verdades científicas. Por eso, hace falta tener un criterio muy sólido y muy discriminativo para saber qué son las verdades científicas porque los científicos, cuando hablan y escriben, lo hacen muchas veces en calidad de ciudadanos y es relevante poder distinguir cuándo están hablando como ciudadanos, o como literatos, o como filósofos espontáneos, y cuándo están hablando como científicos de cosas que son auténticas verdades científicas. La teoría del cierre categorial es la filosofía de la ciencia asociada a una ontología hiperrealista, materialista. Esto es una novedad dado que los filósofos materialistas del siglo XIX y XX no llegaron a desarrollar una filosofía de la ciencia específica, sino que se contentaron con seguir a grandes rasgos la filosofía de la ciencia del positivismo.

Gustavo Bueno expuso su teoría en un tratado en cinco volúmenes con más de mil cuatrocientas páginas, y siguiendo la teoría del cierre categorial se han realizado más de una docena de tesis doctorales monográficas (Lafuente 1973, Fernández, T.R. 1980, López 1983, Fuentes 1985, Alvargonzález 1989a, Hidalgo, 1990, Iglesias 1992, Fernández Treseguerres1993, Baños 1993, Fernández, S. 1995, Huerga 1997, Álvarez 2002, Madrid 2009, Barbado 2015).

La idea de cierre operatorio

La idea de cierre categorial tiene dos partes, la idea de cierre operatorio y la idea de categoría. Por lo que hace a la idea de cierre, todo el mundo tiene un conocimiento práctico de lo que es cerrar una puerta, todo el mundo conoce el concepto técnico de cerrar algo. Un concepto más específico es el concepto algebraico de cierre operatorio: en álgebra, una operación es cerrada cuando, dados dos términos de un conjunto, los operamos, y el término resultante pertenece al mismo conjunto. Por ejemplo, si tomamos los números naturales y aplicamos la suma, los resultados son siempre otros números naturales: esa es una operación cerrada. La operación no cerrada es cuando, dados dos números naturales, por ejemplo, el uno y el tres, los dividimos y obtenemos un tercio que ya no es un número natural. Esta es la idea de cierre operatorio, es decir, dos términos de un conjunto que operados dan elementos del mismo conjunto. Gustavo Bueno tomó está idea y la amplió, aplicándola no solamente a las ciencias formales, a las matemáticas, o al álgebra, sino a todas las ciencias. Si cogemos dos compuestos químicos y los operamos, nos resulta otro compuesto químico, no resulta una célula o un elefante, ya que esos son términos del campo de la biología. Si operamos con términos del campo de la química obtenemos términos del campo de la química y, sin embargo, si cogemos dos organismos biológicos y los cruzamos pues aparece otro organismo biológico, no nos da como resultado, digamos, ácido sulfúrico. Esa es la idea de cierre operatorio: cuando estamos en un campo y operamos dentro de ese campo, obtenemos nuevos términos de ese mismo campo. De este modo, a través del propio proceso de las operaciones, el campo se va ordenando y se va cerrando espontáneamente (cuando esto ocurre). 

Las categorías de Aristóteles

El adjetivo “categorial” viene del nombre “categoría”. “Categorial” es lo que tiene que ver con las categorías. Con antecedentes en Platón y Parménides, la idea de categoría es un invento de Aristóteles quien propuso una tabla famosa de categorías. “Categorein”, en griego, significa “predicar”, y las categorías son las cosas que se pueden decir del sujeto. Aristóteles supuso que de un sujeto se pueden predicar cosas acerca de su sustancia, de su cantidad, de su cualidad, de su relación, del lugar en donde está, del tiempo en el que está, de la posición, etcétera. Aristóteles hizo una lista y a esas cosas que se predican del sujeto las llamó categorías. Las categorías desde entonces, por la propia concepción de la filosofía aristotélica, se entendieron como una especie de géneros ontológicos máximos. Es un poco parecido, por poner un ejemplo proporcionado, a lo que ocurre en biología cuando se habla de los géneros máximos de los organismos biológicos. En ese caso, los géneros máximos son los reinos: vegetal, animal, los hongos, las moneras, las protoctistas (si nos referimos a la célebre clasificación, hoy ya superada, de Whitacker). Pues bien, si nos preguntamos ahora por los géneros máximos, no sólo de la biología, sino de todo lo existente, de toda la realidad, esos géneros máximos serían las categorías, y su determinación tiene mucha importancia porque se supone que esas categorías nos informan acerca de la manera cómo la realidad está estructurada. Decía Platón que el buen carnicero es el que corta al animal por las junturas naturales frente al mal carnicero que lo corta de cualquier manera (Fedro 265a-266c). Pues bien, lo que Aristóteles se estaba preguntando es cuáles son las junturas naturales, los géneros máximos, para dividir todo lo real, y esos géneros máximos son las categorías. El asunto de saber cuáles son las categorías, es decir, los círculos máximos, los géneros máximos de la realidad, es un asunto central de todo sistema filosófico: toda filosofía que aspire a cierta sistematicidad tiene que comprometerse con esta tarea pues necesita tener cierto mapa que establezca por dónde están las junturas naturales de la realidad.

¿Por qué Bueno interpreta el cierre operatorio de las ciencias como un cierre “categorial”?

La teoría del cierre categorial de Gustavo Bueno supone una “vuelta del revés” de la teoría de Aristóteles, en especial de la interpretación que la filosofía escolástica cristiana hizo de esa teoría aristotélica. Un fraile dominico, Nicolás Bonetti, sostuvo que, si las categorías eran géneros máximos, cada uno de esos géneros tendría que ser estudiado por una ciencia diferente: habría una ciencia de la cantidad, otra de la cualidad, otra del tiempo, del lugar, etcétera. Es decir, propuso la idea de que habría tantas ciencias como categorías. Gustavo Bueno dio la vuelta del revés a este planteamiento: no es que cada ciencia estudie una categoría determinada previamente por no se sabe qué procedimiento, sino que lo que ocurre es que cada ciencia realmente existente puede interpretarse como una categoría ontológica. Existe, pues, una categoría física, una categoría química, una categoría biológica, una categoría psicológica, histórica, lingüística, etcétera, y esas son las junturas naturales que dividen la realidad en partes. Ahora bien, la cuestión es justificar por qué se puede dar este paso. Para explicarlo voy a poner una analogía meteorológica que, manejada con el debido cuidado, puede resultar de utilidad. Imaginemos un ambiente atmosférico que está cargado de humedad y supongamos que, en un momento dado, baja la temperatura, se atraviesa el punto de rocío, y entonces la humedad se condensa y da lugar a una nube. Si no hay viento y está el ambiente en calma, la nube que se forma es un estrato, es una nube homogénea de estructura horizontal, pero, si hay movimientos de aire ascendentes y descendentes, por ejemplo, porque hay un calentamiento diferencial del suelo y una parte de ese suelo tiene un albedo más alto o más bajo que otra, ese calentamiento diferencial hace que se formen, por ejemplo, cumulus humilis, los llamados cúmulos de buen tiempo, que son la típica nube blanca de base plana y parte superior redondeada. Pues bien, nuestra especie lleva operando con las cosas del mundo más o menos desde el paleolítico medio, y lleva haciendo cosas, y transformando cosas, y mezclando, y separando, calentando, destilando, componiendo, descomponiendo, rompiendo y volviendo a unir, y cuando nosotros operamos con las cosas del mundo, lo que ocurre es que se forman “nubes” operatorias, que son los cierres operatorios. No se forma una estructura homogénea como la del estrato, o una estructura regular, como podría ser un diamante de carbono que tuviera todos sus átomos perfectamente alineados y a la misma distancia, con la misma disposición geométrica. Lo que se forman son torbellinos operatorios, y torbellinos que empiezan a tener una independencia unos de otros: el torbellino de la biología frente al de la física, o frente al de la química. En el ejemplo meteorológico, el sol tiene que estar calentando, pero no es el único responsable de que se formen las nubes porque éstas se forman por el calentamiento diferencial del suelo y por las diferencias de humedad y de energía cinética. En el caso de las ciencias, nosotros tenemos que estar operando, pero no tenemos control sobre los resultados de los torbellinos operatorios, sobre las ciencias que se forman, no sabemos por qué se forman esos y no otros. Esto es así porque nosotros no podemos estipular los resultados de las operaciones y esos resultados de esos torbellinos operatorios dan lugar a estructuras que no dependen de nosotros. Cuando nosotros mezclamos ácido sulfúrico con hidróxido de sodio para obtener el sulfato de sodio, el resultado no depende nosotros, ya que ese resultado depende de la estructura de la materia, de la estructura de la realidad. Cuando nosotros operamos, los resultados de las operaciones y el modo cómo se organizan los “cúmulos operatorios”, depende de la estructura de la realidad, es un resultado “anantrópico”. Nosotros no podemos decir “vamos a hacer una ciencia aquí” pues no podemos tener la seguridad de que vaya a resultar así. Tampoco podemos proponernos juntar dos ciencias existentes. Los físicos llevan dos siglos intentando unificar la física de partículas con la física de Einstein y muchos dudan incluso de que ello sea posible. Muchísimo menos podemos unificar la física con la biología, es decir, explicar todos los procesos biológicos desde los principios de la física. La realidad no funciona así: las leyes de la biología son otras, hay otros principios diferentes de los de la física, porque la biología es otra categoría, es otra región de la realidad distinta. Nosotros no podemos dictar la estructura de la realidad; nosotros operamos, vamos transformando cosas; en el propio proceso de las transformaciones se van organizando esos cúmulos operatorios; y esos cúmulos operatorios pueden ser interpretados como categorías ontológicas porque nos proporcionan las junturas naturales por las que se divide la realidad cuando se transforma. Este es el interés de la teoría del cierre categorial de Gustavo Bueno: las ciencias, esos cúmulos operatorios, son el único criterio para conocer las junturas naturales por donde se rompe la realidad al codeterminarse sus partes, ya que nosotros no controlamos los cierres de las ciencias puesto que esos cierres son resultados anantrópicos. Las ciencias cierran de acuerdo con la estructura operatoria y con la estructura de los resultados de lo que se está operando: por eso el cierre operatorio puede interpretarse como un cierre categorial, es decir, el cierre de las ciencias nos da la pista de cómo está estructurado el mundo en categorías. Esto que parece tan sencillo, supone la vuelta del revés de la teoría de Nicolás Bonetti y de Aristóteles, y tiene muchísima importancia porque las categorías son algo así como el “mapa” de la estructura del mundo: las relaciones entre las ciencias, entre sus fronteras y entre sus cierres operatorios son las que nos informan que la legalidad biológica es distinta de la legalidad física, de la química, de la histórica, de la psicológica, de modo que esas categorías no se reducen unas a otras. Por mucho que los físicos pretendan hacer teorías del todo y reducirlo todo a física, la terca realidad es que el mundo no tiene esa estructura unificada. Es necesario reconocer un pluralismo gnoseológico y ontológico lo que significa reconocer que unas áreas de la realidad son irreductibles a otras. Ahora bien, podríamos preguntarnos: ¿por qué la estructura de la realidad es así? ¿por qué hay física, y química, y biología, como ciencias distintas, inconmensurables entre sí? La respuesta es que no lo sabemos ya que el mapa de las ciencias es un resultado anantrópico, es un resultado que se nos impone. La historia de las ciencias hace que se decanten unas determinadas ciencias y, en la medida en que esos cierres se imponen al sujeto, no queda más remedio que interpretarlos como la estructura de la realidad, como categorías ontológicas.

La importancia de la teoría del cierre categorial y el hiperrealismo

El desarrollo de las ciencias de los últimos cuatro siglos nos permite saber, con certeza absoluta, que lo que ven nuestros ojos, lo que oyen nuestros oídos, y lo que perciben los órganos de nuestros sentidos, es decir, nuestro mundo fenoménico entorno, no es ni la centésima parte de lo que existe. Más allá de las ondas de luz están las ondas ultravioletas, los infrarrojos, las ondas de radio, todo el espectro electromagnético. Todo está lleno de cosas y de transformaciones que no podemos ver porque son minúsculas, o porque tienen unos tamaños gigantescos o están a grandes distancias. Tampoco podemos ver los procesos evolutivos de la historia natural, aunque están ahí actuando, por sus resultados, en nuestros cuerpos. Y lo mismo ocurre con toda la historia política que está presente en nosotros, ejercitada en el idioma, en las tradiciones, en la cultura. Todo eso son cosas que no se pueden ver porque son muy pequeñas o muy grandes, porque están en otras longitudes de onda, en otras longitudes acústicas, o porque están en el pasado al que no se puede viajar. Sin embargo, están determinando nuestro presente. La mayor parte de lo que sabemos que existe es “hiperreal”, es decir, es una realidad que está ahí, que nos está determinando íntegramente, que determina nuestras enfermedades y nuestro nacimiento y nuestra muerte, y que no podemos percibir pues no está a la escala de nuestras sensaciones. La realidad es mucho más densa de lo que aparece ante nuestros sentidos: esa es la idea del hiperrealismo. A todo ese mundo hiperrealista sólo se accede por la ciencia, única y exclusivamente. Por eso el asunto sobre el que gira la teoría del cierre categorial es un tema central de cualquier sistema filosófico del presente y del futuro, porque ese mundo hiperrealista, hiperdenso, que no podemos ver, cada vez crece más, cada vez aumenta más, cada vez se amplía más, y cada vez es más importante desde un punto de vista práctico. Y sólo es accesible por las ciencias. 

Si admitimos la tesis de que las ciencias son el único modo de acceder a toda esa hiperrealidad, a toda esa realidad ampliada, tenemos que dejar de ver las ciencias como si fuesen un mapa de un terreno que pudiéramos recorrer directamente. En cartografía, nosotros hacemos unas operaciones sobre el terreno y unas operaciones con lápiz y papel sobre el mapa, de modo que se puede establecer una correspondencia entre las primeras y las segundas, y esa correspondencia es la que nos permite hablar de un mapa verdadero. En la mayoría de las ciencias que van referidas a esa hiperrealidad, no podemos proceder de ese modo precisamente porque los contenidos de sus teoremas (las partículas, las ondas, los procesos geológicos y evolutivos, las estructuras geométricas, etc.) no están dados a la escala de nuestros órganos sensoriales. No podemos comparar el “mapa” (las teorías científicas) con el terreno (la realidad de las cosas) porque no hay otra manera de acceder a esa realidad que no sea a través de esas mismas teorías. Por tanto, la verdad científica no puede entenderse ya nunca más como una adecuación entre las teorías y los hechos: es aquí donde la teoría del cierre categorial es capaz de ofrecer una alternativa que, cuando menos, es necesario discutir.

Referencias bibliográficas

Álvarez, Evaristo (2002): El cierre categorial de la geología, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Alvargonzález, David (1989a): Ciencia y materialismo cultural, Madrid, UNED.

Alvargonzález, David (2000): “Análisis gnoseológico del campo de la teoría de juegos.” El Basilisco 28: 17-36.

Baños, Carmen (1993): La antropología social de E.E. Evans-Pritchard: un enfoque gnoseológico, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Barbado, Pedro (2015): Ciencia, proceso, verdad. El estudio científico del delito desde el materialismo filosófico, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo

Bueno, Gustavo (1972): Ensayo sobre las categorías de la economía política. Barcelona, La Gaya Ciencia. http://fgbueno.es/gbm/gb72cep.htm

Bueno, Gustavo (1976): Estatuto gnoseológico de las ciencias humanas. Madrid, España, Fundación Juan March. http://fgbueno.es/gbm/egch.htm

Bueno, Gustavo (1978a): “En torno al concepto de ciencias humanas.” El Basilisco 2: 12-46. http://fgbueno.es/bas/pdf/bas10202.pdf

Bueno, Gustavo (1993): Teoría del cierre categorial. Oviedo, Pentalfa.

Bueno, G. (1995): ¿Qué es la ciencia? Oviedo, Pentalfa. http://www.filosofia.org/aut/gbm/1995qc.htm

Fernández Tresguerres, Alfonso (1992): Naturaleza filosófica de las teorías sobre la agresión, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Fernández, Secundino (1995): Estatuto gnoseológico de la Scienza Nuova de Giambattista Vico, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Fernández, Tomás R. (1980): Gnoseología de las ciencias de la conducta, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Fuentes, Juan Bautista (1985): El problema de la construcción científica en psicología: análisis epistemológico del campo de la psicología científica, tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

Hidalgo, Alberto (1990): Gnoseología de las ciencias de la organización administrativa (la organización de la ciencia y la ciencia de la organización), tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Huerga, Pablo (1997): Filosofía, ciencia y sociedad en el materialismo filosófico: análisis filosófico de Las raíces socioeconómicas de la Mecánica de Newton de Boris Hessen, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Iglesias, Carlos (1991): El nacimiento de las ciencias filológicas: análisis gnoseológico, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo. 

Lafuente, M. Isabel (1973): Causalidad y conocimiento según Piaget, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

López, José Antonio (1983): Gnoseología e historia de la prueba automática de teoremas lógicos, tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo.

Madrid, Carlos (2009): La equivalencia matemática entre mecánicas cuánticas y la impredecibilidad en las teorías del caos: dos casos de estudio para el debate realismo-instrumentalismo, tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

¿Cual es el papel de la Filosofía en una sociedad política?¿Para qué sirve la Filosofía?Breve video donde el filósofo español Gustavo Bueno(Santo Domingo de la Calzada , 2014- Niembro, Asturias, 2016)expone sus argumentos con precisión de cirujano. Breve extracto de un video más extenso. Fijarse en especial desde el minuto 4.0

La filosofía en el conjunto del saber…y del hacer. Exposición desde el sistema del Materialismo Filosófico (ojo, no es el Materialismo Histórico de Marx, ni el Materialismo Dialéctico de Engels)

COMENTARIO DE INTROFILOSOFIA: Este breve comentario sobre qué es y para qué sirve la Filosofía, resulta vital para sobrevivir en esta Era de la Post-Verdad a donde nos quieren conducir , las mafia políticas ,periodísticas, sindicales y financieras, como corderos al matadero, o al esquiladero. La Filosofía sirve , como dice en la célebre metáfora expresada a través de El Mito de la Caverna, Platón, en su libro tuitulado La República, para quitarnos las cadenas de la ignorancia y tratar, con mucho esfuerzo de lograr ver la realidad de las cosas que conforman el mundo en que vivimos, con la mayor claridad posible, para ,precisamente , no ser esclavos de la opinión, del subjetivismo que cae en la oscuridad más vil. Por esto hemos presenciado en estos tiempos de posmodernismo, globalización, de cualquiera de sus partes y segmentos diversos, permanentes ataques contra la introducción de los estudios serios y rigurosos d ella Historia de la Filosofía, y de una Introducción a la Filosofía como un saber de segundo grado, no idealista ,ni metafísica, sino fuertemente arraigada en un materialismo gnoseológico, que parte de los saberes de las demás Ciencias, y del conocimiento de las tecnologías, para buscar desarmar las nebulosas que sirven a los que manipulan con engaños y recursos a la inteligencia emocional y otras lindezas posmodernas , para mantener a la mayor parte posible de gente en el fondo de la caverna platónica, atado s por las cadenas de la ignorancia y creyendo que las meras sombras de sombras , las apariencias que oscurecen y ocultan la realidad que es nuestro mundo material, puedan seguir sacando de nosotros todo lo que pude a cambio de unos mendrugos y migajas de sus festines.Esto es la decadencia de una sociedad. Por eso es importante la Filosofía.El arte de separar, de cribar, de triturar para ver mejor cada parte de los todos complejos que enfrentamos a lo largo de la vida. En resumen : triturar y denunciar los mitos de todo tipo que son perjudiciales para ser más libres, en el sentido de la palabra que le da el filósofo sefardí Espinosa

Profesor David Alvargonzález (Universidad de Oviedo, España) : Proposal of a Classification of Analogies. Desarrollos planteados a partir del Materialismo Filosófico de Gustavo Bueno

CONSIDERAMOS — INTROFILOSOFIA — EL PRESENTE TEXTO, UN ARTICULO ESENCIAL PARA ENTENDER LAS POSIBILIDADES IMPLICITAS EN LA OBRA DEL FILOSOFO ESPAÑOL GUSTAVO BUENO, DE AHI QUE LO RECOMENDAMOS ENCARECIDAMENTE POR SU IMPORTANTE SERIE DE APORTES AL MATERIALISMO FILOSOFICO EN CURSO

Gustavo Bueno, a la izquierda de la imagen, con David Alvargonzález, posiblemente uno de los más cualificados para seguir desarrollando temas fundamentales a partir del sistema del Materialismo Filosófico creado por su maestro G Bueno, fundador de dicho sistema filosófico

 Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 

FUENTE: https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/5082?fbclid=IwAR23BCze4dHf8-0GQbBjL9ICnxikEPYLcy9Lv84saPotooChmXGE8W-DF2Y

DAVID ALVARGONZÁLEZ 

Department of Philosophy 

University of Oviedo Campus de Humanidades, 33011 Oviedo 

Spain 

dalvar@uniovi.es 

Abstract: In this paper, I will propose a classification of analogies based on their internal structure. Selecting the criteria used in that classification first requires discussing the minimal constitutive parts of any analogy. Accordingly, I will discuss the differ-ences between analogy and similarity and between analogy and “synalogy,” and I will stress the importance of the analogy of operations and procedures. Finally, I will set forth a classification of the different types of analogies, which lends itself to a further under-standing of the differences between certain modulations of the general idea of analogy, such as archetypes, prototypes, models, simulations, parables, paradigms, canons, maps, thought experiments, myths, utopias, dystopias and fables. 

Résumé: Dans cet article, je pro-poserai une classification des analo-gies en fonction de leur structure interne. La sélection des critères utilisés dans cette classification nécessite d’abord de discuter des parties constantes essentielles de toute analogie. En conséquence, je vais discuter des différences entre l’analo-gie et la similitude et entre l’analogie et la synalogie, et je vais souligner l’importance de l’analogie des opé-rations et des procédures. Enfin, je vais présenter une classification des différents types d’analogies, qui permet une meilleure compréhension des différences entre certaines modu-lations de l’idée générale d’analogie, telles que les archétypes, les proto-types, les modèles, les simulations, les paraboles, les paradigmes, canons, cartes, expériences de pensée, mythes, utopies, dystopies et fables. 

Keywords: Analogy, model, myth, simulation, thought experiment, utopia 

1. Introduction 

Years back, Jorge Luis Borges described the division of animals as it appeared in a certain Chinese encyclopedia: 

Animals (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included 110 Alvargonzález 

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in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies” (Borges 1993, pp. 104). 

This whimsical classification differs significantly from the phylo-genetic taxonomies of animals based on the theory of evolution, just as there is an epistemic difference between the early alche-mists’ lists of substances and the current periodic table of ele-ments: the first being laundry lists and the second coherent, essen-tial classifications stemming from scientific principles. Classifying triangles or levers by color or material is extrinsic to geometry and physics, whereas classifying triangles by relative length of side (equilateral, isosceles and scalene) and categorizing levers into three classes by the relative position of their constituent parts are intrinsic to geometry and physics. When seeking to establish a classification of internal structure, as occurs with the parts of triangles (sides, angles) and levers (load, effort and fulcrum) in the foregoing examples, identifying the relevant parts of the structures being classified is key. Once the minimal constitutive parts of a given structure have been correctly detected, it is possible to attain a certain degree of completeness in the classification. Conversely, the potency of a structure-based classification may serve to evalu-ate the suitability of the foregoing constitutive parts. The structure of this paper rests on the co-implication of these two tasks (classi-fying and characterizing) as applied to the idea of analogy. 

In addition to the overarching goal of coming to a structure-based classification of analogies, in this paper I will first discuss the constituent parts of any analogy. In the first section, I contend that the idea of analogy arises not only from logic, argumentation theory, linguistics, and perception psychology, but that it is also necessary to take into account the existence of analogies appearing in other contexts such as techniques, technologies, arts, religions, laws, and sciences. The second section deals with the differences between analogy and similarity. In the third section, I discuss the difference between analogy and “synalogy.” In the fourth and fifth sections, I comment on why asymmetry and same-level relation-ship are constitutive features of any analogy. In the section sixth, I stress the importance of analogies that compare operations and Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 111 

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procedures. Finally, in the seventh section, I put forward a pro-posal for classifying analogies according to their previously dis-cussed internal structure. 

2. The sources of the idea of analogy 

By drawing from certain examples, this section looks to show that a full understanding of the idea of analogy cannot be reached by only considering the contents of logic, argumentation theory, linguistics, and perception psychology, and that the existence of analogies in other contexts, such as in techniques, in the arts, in the rest of the sciences, in technologies, in religion and in ethical, political, moral and juridical practice to name but a few, must also be taken into account. Specifically, analogy cannot be reduced to a variety of argumentation since there are many circumstances in which analogies do not have a primarily argumentative function. 

The use of analogies to resolve practical problems can be traced throughout human phylogenies and ontogenesis. Ethologists have recognized the presence of some kind of analogical behavior and reasoning among non-human primates (Thompson and Oden 2000; Oden et al. 2001), while prehistorians and archaeologists have taken for granted the human use of analogies of relations and operations to develop and improve on the most primitive pristine techniques of the Stone Age (Shelley 1999). Furthermore, there is a widespread and well-grounded agreement among cognitive psychologists regarding the central role played by analogy in the learning process of newborns, toddlers, infants, children, adoles-cents and adults (Gentner and Holyoak 1997). 

In historical times, analogy and the proportion between particu-lar beings and situations were recognized as a way to address practical problems (in techniques, engineering, law, rhetoric, war, and policies), and as a tool to assay explanations (in science and philosophy) and discuss practical issues (in politics, philosophy, morality and religion). In legal reasoning, the study of cases (usu-ally actual precedents) has been standard procedure since antiquity both in common law systems (the stare decisis doctrine) where prior cases are the primary source of law and analogies are con-sistently drawn from such cases, and in civil law systems where 112 Alvargonzález 

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case analogies are necessary to fill the gaps when the issue at stake is not explicitly dealt with in written law (Weinreb 2005). The central role of metaphor and allegory in persuasion and rhetoric seems incontrovertible. In military studies, ancient battles have frequently been taken as analogues of future confrontations so as to develop new tactics and strategies and evaluate new war scenar-ios; the same goes for the implementation of new practical policies in peacetime. 

Equally incontrovertible is the fertility of certain analogical models and counter-models in the natural sciences. The most well-known examples of the scientific use of analogies and thought experiments include Galileo’s discussion of falling bodies, Ste-vin’s inclined plane, Newton’s bodies projected in lines parallel to the horizon, Newton’s rotating water bucket, Laplace’s genius, Maxwell’s demon, impossible thermodynamic “machines,” Poin-caré’s and Reichenbach’s flatland, Einstein’s chasing a light beam, Einstein’s trains and elevators, and Schrödinger’s cat, to name but a few. Reduced to a variety of argumentation, the pragmatic and material contents of these scientific analogies may go unnoticed. Indeed, certain analogies and thought experiments have become so familiar that they have shaped our thinking and significantly struc-tured our discourse on relevant issues in science (Brown 1991). 

Metaphors, allegories, myths, thought experiments, utopias, parables, fables, models and counter-models have also been fre-quently used throughout the history of philosophy: Plato’s philo-sophical myths (the ring of Gyges, the Amazons, Atlantis, the androgynes, the cave, etc.), Avicenna’s floating man, Buridan’s ass, Descartes’s evil genius, Leibniz’s mill, Locke’s prince migrat-ed into the body of a cobbler, Hobbes’ Leviathan, renaissance utopias, Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat and Twin Earth, Davidson’s swamp man, Searle’s Chinese room, the Gettier belief argument, and modern dystopias such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, may serve as an cursory list of the presence of such procedures in philosophy. Perelman, among others, has highlighted the critical role of analogy in the history of Western philosophy (Perelman 1969). Furthermore, as regards the three great religions of the book, the parables and allegories contained in the holy texts are Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 113 

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also based on analogies, which serve as a canon of righteous be-havior (which means righteous operations and procedures). 

As illustrated, analogies may be guided by a wide variety of purposes: they can serve to address practical problems (in tech-niques, technologies, engineering, law, rhetoric, war, and policies), to assay theoretical explanations (in science and philosophy), to structure new phenomena (in science), and to discuss arguments of varying natures (in politics, philosophy, morality and religion). 

The idea of analogy, though, does not boil down to a problem of formal (or informal) logic or argumentation theory since it cuts across a wide variety of human activities. The aforementioned illustrations show that discussing this idea requires that a wide range of disciplines and human activities be taken into considera-tion. Acknowledging this fact is of vital importance to understand-ing the argument for the analogy of operations and procedures that I will make below in the sixth section and to generalizing certain findings reached in the theory of argumentation. 

3. The difference between analogy and mere similarity 

The purpose of this section is to state the differences between analogy and mere similarity. Attending to this issue is imperative when discussing the scope of the idea of analogy and the outer edges of the classification of analogies, as proposed below. As found in most treatises, the lexical definitions of analogy always include as their chief feature the comparison and similarity be-tween two or more elements, and, therefore, may induce a confla-tion of the two concepts. The word “analogy” comes from the Latin analogia, which itself comes from the Greek analogia: the prefix ana- meaning “over” (which is related to the Indo-European root an meaning “over,” “up”), the word logos meaning ratio, and the suffix -ia, meaning quality. The etymological structure of the word, with the root “logos,” already suggests the quality of a ratio among two or more things or concepts. Sufficient in ordinary conversational contexts, such lexical and etymological characteri-zations fall short when trying to understand the structure of the underlying idea as it has been forged in philosophy. 114 Alvargonzález 

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Certain cognitive psychologists contend that analogy should be distinguished from mere similarity since “analogy is a clever, sophisticated process used in creative discovery, whereas similari-ty is a brute perceptual process that we share with the entire ani-mal kingdom” (Gentner and Markman 1997, pp. 45-46). Gentner and Toupin argue that analogy implies some manner of systema-ticity and is not “a mere assortment of independent facts” (Gentner and Toupin 1986, pp. 280). Developed by cognitive scientists, the higher-level perception theory of analogy states a clear differentia-tion between perceptual similarity and the higher-level construc-tion of analogies (Mitchell 1993; Hofstadter 1995). From the tenets of structure-mapping theory, Gentner, Rattermann, and Forbus have concluded that similarity-based access to memory depends on what they call “similarity,” while similarity of a match (something very close to “analogy”) depends on the degree of shared higher-order structures, including causal bindings (Gentner et al. 1993). Irrespective, the perception of similarities between elements and processes can be understood as a constitutive, albeit not distinctive, feature of analogies. Analogies imply similarities between their parts; nevertheless, mere similarity between images, things or processes may also appear amid non-human animals, apart from analogical constructions. In the same vein, in research concerning data analysis, Barbosa and others have argued that similarity refers to instances within the same class while analogy involves different classes (Barbosa et al 2007). 

In line with those findings I assume that: 

1. Similarity, likeness and resemblance and the related antonyms dissimilarity, unlikeness, and difference are dyadic relationships grounded on direct perceptions. Consequently, the apprehension of similarity and difference is present in actu exercito in the behav-ioral repertoire of a wide range of non-human animals since it is a capacity humans share with other organisms endowed with a psychological makeup. 

2. Analogy, though, is a more complex relationship implying the determination of the relevant constituents of certain wholes and the representation of proportions between them. Consequently, constructing analogical relationships is a distinctive feature of human beings endowed with a language of words—a feature that Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 115 

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might be shared by certain trained-in-captivity great apes (Thomp-son and Oden 2000). The pragma-dialectical philosophy of Frans H. van Eemeren defines comparison in terms of relevant similarity (Eemeren and Garssen 2014, pp. 45-49). In structure-mapping theory, analogy implies the existence of shared structural relation-ships in the mapping of the elements of source and target (Gentner 1983). 

In analogy, the relationships of similarity between things and processes are always partial. Were a total similarity to exist be-tween them, we would speak of univocal terms, which are not differentiable. An absolute differentiation and lack of any related-ness is a feature of equivocal terms; analogous terms, for their part, feature a certain similarity and a certain differentiation, with some kind of relatedness. Accordingly, analogy could be under-stood as an intermediate position between univocity and equivoci-ty. In her meta-psychological theory of analogy, Dedre Gentner characterizes analogy based on its intermediate place between literal similarity (something very close to univocity) and anomaly (which could be seen as a soft version of equivocity) (Gentner 1983, p. 161). Partial likeness is a constitutive feature of analogy but is also a distinctive quality compared to literal similarity, univocity, anomaly, and equivocity. 

3. The difference between analogy and “synalogy” 

The purpose of this section is to argue that certain types of analo-gies (mainly the so-called analogies of attribution) are not truly analogies and, consequently, should be excluded from the classifi-cation of analogies sensu stricto

In Aquinas, the idea of analogy played an important role since theological anthropology implied that human beings were, in certain features, analogous to God (Lyttkens 1952). By means of analogical arguments, theologians tried to understand both human nature as made in the image of God, and God’s attributes as de-duced from those of humans. Inspired by Aristotle and partially following Aquinas, Thomas de Vio (also known as Cajetan for having been born in Gaeta, Naples) wrote his famous treatise On the Analogy of Names (1498), from which I will take the distinc-116 Alvargonzález 

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tion of three kinds of analogies, since the structure of his analogy of attribution is still taken into consideration in certain present-day studies. The three kinds move from stronger to weaker: 

1. The analogy of proper proportionality, which entails propor-tionality between terms and relations and the symmetric relation-ship between the analogues. 

2. The analogy of improper proportionality or metaphoric propor-tionality. In this case, the analogy refers only to the terms, and the relationship between the analogues is not symmetrical: there is a properly used noun and the other analogues are constructed meta-phorically based on their relationship to the proper noun. 

3. The analogy of attribution, which is the weakest, most improp-er, non-symmetrical analogy since it implies the existence of a first analogue or main analogue to which the others refer obliquely, weakly and indirectly (by symbolic or causal relation). Aquinas called this situation an “analogy because of diverse attributions” (De Veritate 21, 4 ad 4 and Principles of Nature Ch. 6, No. 38). 

In this case, there is always a main analogue, and the other ana-logues acquire their meaning through very indirect reference to it. For instance, an animal can, in the proper sense, be said to be “healthy” (“a healthy animal”), but it can also be predicated indi-rectly on urine (“healthy urine”) to mean that it is a sign of health, on medicine (“healthy medicine”) to signify that it causes health, and on a diet (“healthy diet”) to show that it preserves health. The main analogue is the animal’s health, and the other analogues (urine, medicine, diet) acquire their meaning through it (as signs or causes of health). The first analogue is intrinsic, whereas the oth-ers are said to arise by “extrinsic denomination.” 

However, in this paper I maintain that Cajetan’s analogy of at-tribution is not a proper analogy governed by relations of similari-ty, but is rather a relationship constructed through spatial/temporal or causal contiguity: medicine, urine and diet are called “healthy” by means of “contagion” with the healthy animal. Analogies nec-essarily imply certain relations of similarity (not contiguity) and, consequently, Cajetan’s analogy of attribution is not a true analo-gy. The relationships characterizing Cajetan’s analogies of attribu-tion (Aristotle’s four causes) imply a “contiguity adjustment.” Taking cues from Gustavo Bueno, I will call this kind of relation-Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 117 

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ship “synalogy” taken from the Greek “sinalage” meaning “join-ing” (Bueno 1999). Examples of synalogies include the key and the lock, and the sexual organs during reproduction. Hardly novel, the differences between analogy and synalogy were already at work in Hume’s philosophy when he distinguished, in his Treatise on Human Nature, three principles of association: similarity, contiguity, and cause/effect. Similarity relates to analogy while contiguity and cause/effect imply synalogy. The opposition be-tween synalogy and analogy was also acting in Frazer’s distinction of sympathetic magic into two types: contagious magic, acting by contiguity, and homoeopathic or imitative magic, acting by simi-larity, as explained in his famous book The Golden Bough. 

The distinction between synalogy and analogy is at work in cer-tain biological and linguistic distinctions. Evolutionary biologists clearly distinguish between analogy and homology. When struc-tures pertaining to organisms of two different species share mor-phology and perform the same function, they are analogous. If they share a common ancestry, they are homologous even if they are morphologically and functionally different, as is the case in the extremities of whales, horses and monkeys. I understand homolo-gy as a sort of processual, temporal contiguity. Two analogous structures may be also homologous (such as the eyes of fishes and birds), but when two structures perform the same function and have different ancestries, biologist use the term “homoplasty,” as with the wings of birds and insects. In linguistics, I contend that the distinction between metaphor and metonymy is another modu-lation of the differences between analogy and synalogy. The struc-ture of metaphors is clearly analogical as I will discuss in section seven below. In the metonymy, though, a thing or concept is des-ignated by the name of a different thing with which it shows cer-tain temporal, spatial or causal contiguity. This occurs when the content is designed with the name of the continent, the product with the name of its origin, and the effect by the name of the cause (and vice versa). 

The difference between analogy and synalogy, between similar-ity and contiguity, affects the relationships between analogates (the “horizontal” one-to-one correspondence between analogates to use Juthe’s terminology in Juthe 2016, pp. 83, 109, 431), but it 118 Alvargonzález 

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does not affect the relationships between their elements (Juthe’s “vertical” relationship, Juthe 2016, pp. 83, 109, 431). The parts of each of the analogates can be linked by contiguity (by causality, supervenience, resultance, genus to species etc.), which can be compatible with the correspondence by similarity between analo-gates, with the similarity of their parts, and with the similarity of the contiguity relationships between their parts. For instance, when establishing the analogy between a map and the terrain, the map has its own parts linked by contiguity, as does the terrain, even though the relationship between the two analogates (the map and the terrain) is not by causality or contiguity. The terrain does not cause the map, and does not adjust by contiguity to the map, alt-hough there is a proportional correspondence between the parts of the map and the terrain, and between the contiguity relations of their parts. At this juncture, I follow Holyoak’s definition of anal-ogy whereby “two situations are analogous if they share a com-mon pattern of relationships among their constituents even though the elements themselves differ across the two situations” (Holyoak 2005, p. 117). 

Interestingly, the conflation of analogy and synalogy is not a mere misunderstanding by medieval philosophers, but still occurs today. Guarini and his team include homology among the relations of similarity (Guarini et al. 2009, p. 94). André Juthe (2016, pp. 60-62) has proposed a certain correspondence between the medie-val analogy of attribution and other present-day concepts such as Sacksteder’s qualitative analogy (Sacksteder 1974), Michalos’ analogy based on analogous properties (Michalos 1969), Hesse’s analogical types A and B (Hesse 1965 and 1966), Gentner’s and Markman’s mere appearance matches (Gentner and Markman 1997) and Holyoak’s and Thagard’s attribute mapping (Holyoak and Thagard 1995). Nevertheless, this correspondence is disputa-ble since, in the analogy of attribution, the relationship between the analogates is grounded on causes, ends, and agencies, alt-hough it is established by contiguity, while in the cases studied by Juthe, the relationship between analogates is always a one-to-one correspondence grounded on partial similarity. Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 119 

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5. Analogy and asymmetry 

In what follows, I will argue that asymmetry is a core feature of any analogy. The idea is not new, as the issue was already dis-cussed among Thomistic philosophers. As already stated, Cajetan, following Aquinas (De Veritate, q.2 a11), stated that the most perfect analogy is the analogy of proper proportionality whereby there is complete symmetry between the analogues. Cajetan con-tended that in this kind of symmetric analogy “no analogue is defined by another, since the definition of one is proportionally the same as that of another” (Cajetan 1498, 1953, p. 77). In his Meta-physical Disputations (1596, d. XXVIII, s.3/11), the famous 16th century Spanish philosopher Francisco Suárez argued that analogy always implies asymmetry and criticized Cajetan’s analogy of proper proportionality. According to Suárez, one of the sides of the analogy has to support the weight of the relationship. Follow-ing this criticism, I hold that asymmetry is a core feature of true analogy. Perfect symmetry between the analogues makes it possi-ble to explain two or more particular cases using the same underly-ing principles, but this implies a much closer relationship between the particular cases than mere analogy. The solar system as com-pared with other multi-planetary systems sharing the universal principles of gravity, and similar triangles sharing the same pro-portions serve as illustrations of this symmetrical pattern. In such cases, the supposed analogues are instead illustrations of a general law or proportion. In this paper, I hold that asymmetry is a distinc-tive attribute of analogy. Perfect, symmetric proportionality be-tween two (or more) different objects or situations is but an ex-treme or “degenerated” modulation of asymmetric analogy. In this context, I use the adjective “degenerated” denotatively, not axio-logically, such as when mathematicians characterize the empty set as an extreme, “degenerated set” since it has no elements. 

J.E. Adler has defended the significance of asymmetry in ana-logical arguments, saying that the widely admitted difference between the source and the target of any analogy stands as an indication of the importance of this feature (Adler 2007). The distinction made by William R. Brown between “analans” and 120 Alvargonzález 

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analandum” also suggests the asymmetric relationship between the two poles of any analogy (Brown 1989, p. 164). 

6. Same-level relationship 

In the Aristotelian and scholastic tradition, analogical arguments are always understood as from particular to particular. When moving from the universal to the particular, the argument is deemed deductive. In such cases, the particular may serve as an example or illustration of the universal, although examples and illustrations are different from analogical arguments. The deriva-tion of the universal from particular cases is deemed as an induc-tive procedure. Aristotle, in his treatise On Sophistical Refutations (part 15), discusses the cases where no universal is available: “In cases where there is no term to indicate the universal, still you should avail yourself of the resemblance of the particulars to suit your purpose; for resemblance often escapes detection” (174a37-40). Typical Aristotelian analogies are inspired by the mathemati-cal proportionality A/B=C/D. Aristotle used the following exam-ple to illustrate a typical analogy: as is a calm in the sea so is windlessness in the air (Topics, I, 17, 108a, 7-11). Consequently, deductive and inductive arguments, although including similarities between premises and conclusions, are clearly differentiated from analogical arguments. André Juthe defends the existence of genu-ine arguments by analogy that are not reducible to any other type of argument since “their inferences are always from particular to particular, never from general to particular or from particular to general” (Juthe 2005, p. 19). Ionel Apostolatu, in looking at cer-tain dictionaries, concludes that analogy, in its broad sense, im-plies partial similarity between circumstances, things, and situa-tions moving from particular to particular (Apostolatu 2012, p. 332). Digging further, Juthe, in two later works, characterizes analogical arguments as material/pragmatic same-level reasoning via comparison either from particular to particular or from general to general. Analogies moving from universal to universal are common in ethical analogical argumentation (Juthe 2015, p. 383; 2016, p. 125). In this paper, I assume that this material/pragmatic Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 121 

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same-level relationship between analogates is a core feature of every analogy (not only of analogical arguments). 

7. Analogy of relations and analogy of operations and proce-dures 

In this section, I should like to touch on the nature of the terms and elements being compared in any analogy. Taking cues from the multiconstraint theory of Holyoak and Thagard (Holyoak and Thagard 1995 and 1997) and from Gentner’s structure-mapping theory (Gentner 1983), I assume that the analogy of individual predicates or attributes of objects is not sufficient when character-izing analogies. While analogies do indeed include comparison between objects and attributes of objects, they also require that the relationships between those terms and objects be similar (Perel-man 1969). The analogy between the solar system and the atom entails similarity between the relationship of the Sun with the planets and the relationship of the nucleus with electrons (I am citing this illustration salva veritate), although it also implies similarity between the nucleus of the atom and the Sun and a comparison between planets and electrons. In the typical four-term proportions that underlie metaphors, the comparison is not be-tween the terms, but rather between the relationships of the first pair and those of the second. The presence of analogies between relationships is sometimes obscured by the fact that objects and situations have a complex structure and, consequently, comparing certain attributes of complex objects implicitly presupposes com-paring the relationships between their parts or attributes. The nature of the compared relationships may be highly diverse involv-ing causality, spatial or temporal adjustment, equality, congruence, kinship, correlation, dependence, to cite but a few possibilities. 

As stated, analogy of things includes objects and relations be-tween objects (for instance, situations); however, mention should also be made of the analogy of operations (for instance, the analo-gy of procedures and processes). In any given language, there may be an “analogy of nouns” (as in Cajetan’s treatise), but there may also be an analogy of relations (the analogy of prepositions) and of operations (analogy of actions, analogy of verbs). 122 Alvargonzález 

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Esa Itkonen has proposed a distinction between an analogy un-derstood as a structure, defined by a static relation between sys-tems, and an analogy as the dynamic process that produces those analogical structures (Itkonen 2005). The distinction is most rele-vant since analogies are human constructions and, consequently, are always the result of synthetic human procedures. While I subscribe to Itkonen’s proposal, my argument for the existence of analogies of procedures implies a different idea: the materials being compared proportionally in certain analogies are operations or behaviors of humans and other animals. In such cases, the analogy’s core may depend on the comparison between operations. 

In the oft-quoted analogy between the State and the ship (“the governor is to the Republic as the helmsman is to the ship”), the sameness between the two different domains (political and nauti-cal) can be understood as an analogy of relationships. The rela-tionship between the governor and the citizens is deemed similar to the relationship between the helmsman and the seamen. How-ever, a comparison of the operations involved could also be apro-pos since the operations performed by the prince of the Republic in political praxis are, in certain aspects, like the operations of the helmsman with respect to seamanship. In the analogy between artificial selection and natural selection, the results of the selective operations performed by the human breeder (a farmer or a garden-er) are compared with the results obtained by the operations of organisms in the wild. In the famous analogy of Thomson’s violin-ist, the operations of the aborting woman are compared with those of the woman unplugging the violinist. In those cases, the analogy implies the relative proportionality between two (or more) differ-ent courses of operations. The same occurs in the analogies be-tween two wars separated by many centuries. Operations, proce-dures and processes are always directed by a certain finality; they are teleological (either teleonomic, teleoclinical, or teleomorphic) wholes. Consequently, analogy between operations and processes implies a discussion of the proportionality between goals and ends, which does not occur when taking into account the analogy of relationships alone. 

Interestingly, most present-day studies have failed to discuss the analogy of operations and procedures. In characterizing analo-Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 123 

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gies, Paul Bartha, Dedre Gentner and Kenneth J. Kurtz, Marcello Guarini, André Juthe and many others do not even mention them (Bartha 2016, Gentner 1981, Gentner and Kurtz 2006, Guarini 2009, Juthe 2016, p. 62). I suspect certain reasons for this lack of interest about operations. On one hand, research about analogy frequently focuses on theoretical reasoning and argumentation and consequently centers on the analogy of relationships between analogates. Operations are not directly reflected in sentences and propositions since their meaning is circumscribed to performance thereof and, consequently, they may go unnoticed. On the other hand, cognitive psychologists often understand human behavior from a computational perspective that gives priority to the analogy of relationships over the analogy among operations (see, for in-stance, Gentner et al. 2001). 

8. A classification of the different types of analogies based on their internal structure 

I have hitherto defined analogy as an asymmetrical proportionality stablished among situations, relationships, or operations of relative similar level. Identifying those constituent parts of any analogy makes it possible to construct an internal classification based on three criteria. 

The first criterion, arising from the asymmetric relationship be-tween analogates, could be defined as a “directionality criterion” whereby the route linking their similar items can be traveled in two opposite directions. I term the direction from the familiar source to the less known target “extrapolative” moving from the most known to the relatively unknown, from the actual to the possible. In this case, the analogy has an explorative function: the better-known case (source) serves as a platform from which to clarify the structure of the less known, unfamiliar case (target). An illustration of this extrapolative direction of analogies is the analo-gy between the relatively well-known liquid flow and the unfamil-iar electric current that was introduced in the 19th century. Alt-hough people did not then know exactly what an electric current was, they made an extrapolation and imagined it as a liquid flow such that voltage was immediately aligned with flow pressure. The 124 Alvargonzález 

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cases studied by Adler fulfill this explorative function (Adler 2007). In their theories, Ross (Ross 1983, p. 208), Gentner and Holyoak characterize analogies by reference to this explorative or extrapolative function and do not take the opposite direction into separate consideration (Gentner and Holyoak 1997, p. 33). 

However, the opposite direction has also been frequented. Wil-liam R. Brown taking cues from the distinction between explanan-dum and explanans, as it is used in the philosophy of science, introduces the words “analandum,” (which is the phenomenon to be analyzed), and “analans” (which is the phenomenon taken to analyze the analandum) (Brown 1989, p. 164). I term this direc-tion “analytical,” and although it may appear paradoxical at first glance, it has played an important role in the history of analogies. In such cases, the analans is perhaps still the less known and less familiar part of the analogy—although it is nevertheless under-stood as an instrument used to identify and analyze the relevant constituents of the analanandum since it is supposed to be easier to manipulate or to understand—perhaps because it is more sche-matic in certain relevant aspects. When moral philosophers resort to bizarre analogies and thought experiments such as Thomson’s violinist (1971) or Parfit’s transmogrifying humans (1984) in order to discuss real moral problems, they are invoking bizarre situations (the involuntarily plugged-in violinist or the transmogrified hu-man) to shed light on a real situation (in this case, abortion). Dan-cy, Jackson, Smith and Burns, among others, have discussed the role of analogy in moral deliberation (Dancy 1985, Jackson 1992, Smith 2002 and Burns 2006). 

Although semantical and structural in nature, the directionality criterion introduced in the foregoing classification of analogies implies that analogies may serve two general purposes: the explo-ration of new domains (targets) or the analysis of a familiar do-main (analandum) by taking cues from other analogous contexts (analans). In the first case, the analogy is evaluated by taking into account the fertility of the familiar source so as to organize and structure the target as appropriate. In the second case, the evalua-tion looks into the analytical utility of the patterns suggested by the “artificial” analans. André Juthe has summarized the classifi-cations proposed by different authors based on the function or Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 125 

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purpose of analogies as used in argumentation (Juthe 2016, p. 32-37). His predictive and creative functions coordinate with the proposed exploratory analogies, while classificatory and heuristic functions can be understood as analytical. An important difference should be highlighted: Juthe is classifying the purposes of analogi-cal argumentation, while I am interested in classifying analogies in any context (logic, techniques, technology, politics, law etc.). Accordingly, he concludes that the purpose of argumentation is probative and consequently finds that the various testing proce-dures are the primary criterion when classifying analogical argu-ments. (Juthe 2016, p. 69). 

The proposed directionality criterion is reminiscent of Bartha’s classification of analogies based on the direction of the determin-ing relation. He distinguished four analogical modes: the first two, “predictive” and “explanatory,” approximately correspond to my proposal (extrapolative and analytical). He also introduces a “func-tional” mode linking the analogates in both directions, and a “cor-relative” mode in the absence of directions (Bartha 2010, pp. 95-99). I dispense with those last two modes since they fail to meet the above-proposed criterion of asymmetry between analogates. 

Directionality between analogates should not be confused with other criteria, such as those used in the distinctions between a posteriori and a priori analogies (Govier 1989, 2002, 2010), induc-tive versus deductive analogies (Barker 1989), and empirical versus normative analogies (Langenbucher 1998; Eemeren and Garssen 2014). These distinctions may be of interest while classi-fying analogical arguments but are scantly relevant while classify-ing analogies in general. When taking into consideration certain analogies (and not just arguments by analogy), their a priori and a posteriori aspects, their inductive and deductive character, and their empirical and normative contents are so inextricably con-nected that such classification criteria are not of much use. An example may serve to illustrate this claim. In the analogy between the brain and the computer, both analogates are quite well known (a priori and a posteriori), both include deductive and inductive suppositions, and both involve normative and empirical contents. Consequently, it is not possible to assess whether this analogy is a priori or a posteriori, inductive or deductive, empirical or norma-126 Alvargonzález 

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tive. The same can be said about the majority of the illustrations presented in table 1 below. 

The second criterion of classification depends on the domain constraints of the analogates. This criterion takes advantage of André Juthe’s distinction between a same-domain analogy and a different-domain analogy (Juthe 2005, 2015, and 2016), and it equally affects the internal structure of analogies. In the same-domain analogy, the two elements belong to the same domain. The analogy between a real plane flying in the air and a scale model plane in a wind tunnel remains in the same domain (aerodynamics) although the results cannot be automatically transferred from one scale to the other. In the different-domain analogy, the components of the analogy belong to wholly different domains. The aforemen-tioned analogy between liquid flow and electric current may serve as an example. 

Metaphors can be defined as different-domain analogies, as in Cajetan’s analogy of metaphoric proportionality. In those cases, there is one name which is used properly and, from its use, certain other analogues can be constructed in which the name is used improperly or metaphorically. As an illustration, Cajetan cites the following example: laughter is to the face as flowers are to the field and as fortune is to human life. As such, metaphorically one can say that flowers are the laughter of the field, and fortune is the laughter of life. In this kind of analogy, as can be seen, the analogy falls mainly on the terms (laughter = flowers = fortune). The met-aphor occurs when the terms of two (or more) different domains are interchanged. Lakoff and Johnson, in their famous book Meta-phors We Live By, have shown the extensive presence of a wide variety of metaphors in our daily lives (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The etymology of the word “metaphor” is consistent with this interpretation of metaphors as different-domain analogies, since the Greek word metaphorá is formed from the suffix “meta-” meaning “after” or “across,” and the root “phero” meaning “to carry.” Although metaphors usually imply different-domain analo-gies, not all different-domain analogies have the structure of meta-phor as I will show below. 

André Juthe has discussed certain previous distinctions that can be coordinated with his proposal for the difference in domains Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 127 

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(Juthe 2016, pp. 46-47). These include Santibáñez’s distinction between analogical argumentation and metaphor (Santibáñez 2010), Weitzenfeld’s and Weingartner’s difference between ho-meomorphs and paramorphs (Weitzenfeld 1984, Weingartner 1979), Ruiz’s and Luciano’s division of within-domain and cross-domain analogies (Ruiz and Luciano 2011), Kokinov’s classifica-tion of intra- and inter-domain analogies (Kokinov 2013), Gars-sen’s literal versus figurative analogies (Garssen 2009), and Bowdle’s and Gentner’s differentiation between domain-specific and cross-domain analogies (Bowdle and Gentner 2005). 

In this paper, I will argue that different-domain analogies, in turn, can be divided into two subtypes based on the ontological status of the different domains involved. In fact, when evaluating the domains of a given analogy, two situations may happen. Either both domains are real, or one of them is real and the other ficti-tious. In the first case, we do not abandon the real existing world. For example, the analogy between brains and computers is a dif-ferent-domain analogy since biology and cybernetics are, in prin-ciple, different categories, but both domains are real. In the second case, one of the analogy domains is not real and exists only as something imagined or “sketched,” as a product of fantasy. Certain thought experiments with fantastic beings, such as Laplace’s genius or Maxwell’s demon, may serve as illustrations of analo-gies having an unreal component. 

The last criterion of classification focuses on the elements of comparison of the analogy, which can be either exclusively rela-tional or both relational and operational. An analogy can be cen-tered on domains stated outside the influence of any operational being. For example, the aforementioned analogies between the real plane and the scale model or between liquid flow and electric current focus on comparing certain objects and relations between objects, and such analogies can be understood as independent from the operations of subjects (technicians, scientists, etc.). The analo-gy between artificial and natural selection, and the analogy of Thomson’s violinist mentioned above serve as illustrations of the comparison among operations. The analogy between a utopia and the real world implies analogies between objects and relations; however, it must involve analogies of human operations since the 128 Alvargonzález 

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core of the analogy requires a comparison of the individual actions and operations of people in the imagined world with those in the real world. In the fields of natural sciences, analogies usually have a relational nature, while in the field of human and ethological sciences, operational analogies are frequent since those sciences need to take into account the behaviors of certain human and non-human animals. 

To summarize: 

1. Based on their function, analogies are extrapolative when they move from a familiar source so as to explore a relatively unknown target. Conversely, they are analytical if they make use of certain features of an artificial analans to shed light on the analandum

2. The analogates domains can be similar or different. When dif-ferent, they can either both be real, or one of them can be real (positive) and the other fictitious. 

3. In certain cases, comprehending analogies only requires taking into consideration the similarities between terms and relationships of the analogates, while in other cases the similarities between the elements of comparison include the operations of certain involved subjects. 

To conclude this paragraph, the following table lays out the three criteria and shows the extent to which they may be useful in understanding the differences and similarities of a wide-ranging sample of analogies. It includes some of the components of the resulting types of analogies and makes careful use of the most suitable words while attending to their lexical structure and ety-mology. Proposal of a Classification of Analogies 129 

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TABLE 1: TYPES OF ANALOGIES ACCORDING TO THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURE 
1. DIRECTION  2. DOMAINS EXTRAPOLATIVE  from source to target ANALYTICAL  from analans to analandum 
SAME-DOMAIN ANALO-GY  source as archetype or exemplar  Oken’s vertebrate archetype II  source as precedent, prototype  stare decisis doctrine  qiyas III  same-domain model,  morphism  scale model plane in the wind tunnel IV  same-domain simulation  learning simulator 
DIFFERENT-DOMAIN ANALOGY BOTH REAL  source as paradigm  liquid flow/electric current,  Plato’s line analogy VI  source as canon  artificial selection/ natural selection VII  different-domain model  mapping,  brain/computer analogy VIII  different-domain simulation  game simulation,  parables, Thomson’s violinist 
ONE REAL (POSITIVE) AND ANOTHER FICTITIOUS IX  extrapolative thought experiment in natural sciences,  myth  Einstein riding on a beam of light,  Plato’s Timaeus  extrapolative  thought experiments in social sciences,  utopia,  soteriological myths  More’s Utopia,  Skinner’s Walden Two XI  analytical thought experiments in natural sciences, myth  EPR paradox,  Plato’s myth of the cave XII  analytical thought experiments in social sciences,  myth, fable,  dystopia  Lessing’s “Three rings parable”,  Buridan’s ass,  Ethics thought experiments 
3. ELEMENTS OF COM-PARISON TERMS & RELATIONS ONLY TERMS, RELATIONS & OPERATIONS TERMS &  RELATIONS ONLY TERMS, RELATIONS & OPERATIONS 

Publiée 2020-02-28 NuméroVol. 40 No 1 (2020) RubriqueArticlesCopyright for each article published in Informal Logic belongs to its author(s). Informal Logic has the right of first publication. Permission to reprint any article that appears in Informal Logic MUST be obtained in writing from the author(s). In addition to any form of acknowledgement required by the author(s), the following notice must be added to the statement of copyright permission made in the reprint (with the appropriate numbers replacing the ellipses): [Article Title] was originally published in Informal Logic, [year], Volume …, Number …, pp. …-… .

El Derecho Natural, un concepto metafísico, según la tesis de Gustavo Bueno.

youtu.be/c0bv3BRdmvY

La racionalidad noetológica de las artes poéticas. Un análisis y debate sobre las diferencias entre Ciencias alfa y Ciencias beta operatorias, desde el Materialismo Filosófico de Gustavo Bueno.Clase y exposición de Ekaitz Ruiz de Vergara Olmos en la sede de la Fundación Gustavo Bueno . Oviedo(España)17 de febrero de 2020. Desde INTROFILOSOFIA, consideramos de sumo interés agregar a estos videos, uno que hemos conocido el 1º de marzo 2020, que consideramos la respuesta de Jesús Maestro a la cuestión, EJERCIDA Y REPRESENTADA , si bien aparentemente d modo indirecto, pero , nos parece, CONTUNDENTE

Desde la polémica que se dio durante los Cursos de de Verano la Universidad de La Rioja (en el verano del año 2018), en torno a cuestiones gnoseológicas y de crítica filosófico materialista sobre la cuestión de una Teoría Crítico Materialista de la Literatura, nos encontramos, precisamente, en esta clase y conferencia de Ekaitz Ruiz de Vergara , una nueva plataforma para tratar de analizar y criticar, desde las propias coordenadas del Materialismo Filosófico de Gustavo Bueno, el problema que debatieron, específicamente, en ese curso de verano enSanto Domingo de la Calzada, en La Rioja(España), del año 2018, Tomás García y Jesús González Maestro.

La polémica básicamente consistió en dos posiciones que se enfrentaron, y al parecer, en ese momento, tal asunto parecía haber quedado en tablas. O se dejaba abierta la discusión .

Entre tanto, desde la Teoría Materialista de la Música, Vicente Chuliá tomaba parte en tal polémica en favor de la teoría defendida por Tomás García, en cuanto a que las Artes, en el caso de Chuliá, la Música, no son operaciones que se deban considerar como las Ciencias alfa operatorias, sino como noetologías. No desde la gnoseología, o al menos no exclusiva y absolutamente desde la gnoseología, sino que su elemento dominante sería la noeotología.

Y lo más interesante, a mi juicio, es que en la clase y conferencia del joven expositor, Ekaitz, parece ser que tenemos una tesis muy bien fundamentada , que toma partido por el hecho de que la poética ha de ser considerada como un caso de estudio que precia ser hecho desde la noetología, pues , esta es la crítica de Ekaitz, siguiendo lo que ha ido exponiendo en base a textos de Gustavo Bueno. La poética sería pues , objeto de la noetología.

Una de las cuestiones más valiosas para la crítica y el análisis, a mi juicio, la encontramos en la exposición rigurosa y sistemática, de las diferencias clave entre gnoseología y neotología, y las implicaciones que estas diferencias aportan al sistema filosófico del Materialismo Filosófico.

Cuestiones fundamentales y polémicas sobre la racionalidad de la poética, desde el Materialismo Filosófico( de Gustavo Bueno) como Teoría de las Ciencias
Estudio de La Literatura: ¿ Gnoseología o Noetología ?

ARTICULO EN LA REVISTA METABASIS (2019)

La «Crítica de la Razón Literaria» de Jesús González Maestro vista desde el materialismo filosófico

AUTOR: Ekaitz Ruiz de Vergara Olmos

(Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

https://metabasiseisallogenos.files.wordpress.com/2019/11/metabasis-004-039-149.pdf


IMPRESCINDIBLE , PARA EL DEBATE, Y PARA LA CRITICA: Desde esta exposición, cualquier persona interesada en ver cuál es realmente el alcance de la Crítica de la Razón Literaria, la obra clave del profesor Jesús G Maestro, encontrará aquí tesis fundamentales que acaban por darle la razón a su tesis de que hay , no una noetología para estudiar lo que es la Literatura y la Literatura Comparada. Se deduce claramente, nos parece, que SI hay una Ciencia de la Literatura, tal como sostiene el profesor Maestro a lo largo de sus tres mil páginas en su citada obra , que da lugar a este video.