Ego trascedental, versión Gustavo Bueno o versión Sartre?

La reciente publicación del libro El Ego trascendental, de Gustavo Bueno, y la obra La trascedencia del Ego, de Jean-Paul Sartre, ameritan un estudio comparativo que acaso aclare muchas confusiones respecto a idealismo, materialismo, metafísica y filosofía

 

Aquí un enlace donde acceder a la versión ( en francés) del libro de Sartre:

https://es.scribd.com/document/320513898/La-Transcendance-de-LEgo-Et-Autres-Texte

 

<p  style=” margin: 12px auto 6px auto; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; -x-system-font: none; display: block;”>   <a title=”View La Transcendance de LEgo Et Autres Texte on Scribd” href=”https://es.scribd.com/document/320513898/La-Transcendance-de-LEgo-Et-Autres-Texte#from_embed&#8221;  style=”text-decoration: underline;” >La Transcendance de LEgo Et Autres Texte</a></p>https://www.scribd.com/embeds/320513898/content?start_page=1&view_mode=scroll&show_recommendations=true

 

 

Para recordar a Gustavo Bueno, el filósofo más interesante en los últimos años

bueno_leccion

Hoy , 7 de agosto de 2016 ha muerto el filósofo español Gustavo Bueno.

Me gustaría sugerir , como recuerdo a su obra , leer este que , me parece, es el último libro suyo.

El Ego trascendental

http://helicon.es/pen/7848561.htm

A los sucriptores de Kindle unlimited se les permite la lectura on-line gratuita.. hay que suscribirse a Kindle, pero vale la pena para esta lectura https://www.amazon.es/gp/product/B01BLG7FW2

 

El monstruo de las montañas (crímenes de Estado en México)

VIDEO en The New Yorker

http://dp8hsntg6do36.cloudfront.net/5513f9f061646d0cfa000000/a9c2ea39-7b5e-4193-a235-bf0d03928250low.webm

‘El monstruo de las montañas’

30 de marzo, 2015.- The New Yorker compartió este día un video con motivo de los seis meses de la desaparición de los 43 normalistas de Ayotzinapa, donde se puede observar el sufrimiento de la familia y las acciones que hoy en día se tratan de llevar a cabo para encontrar a los normalistas. “Hay una lucha entre un gigante… y la población pobre”, dice el activista Abel Herrera Hernandez, en el cortometraje de la prestigiada revista estadounidense.

fuente http://www.4vientos.net/?cat=24

http://dp8hsntg6do36.cloudfront.net/5513f9f061646d0cfa000000/a9c2ea39-7b5e-4193-a235-bf0d03928250low.webm

Nazismo y filosofía , el caso Heidegger y los Cuadernos Negros

Martin Heidegger, para muchos el más relevante de los filósofos del siglo XX, para otros, un filósofo que al operar desde la ideología de la Raza, desde la ideología nazi, es todo lo contrario…

 

Veamos qué nos dicen en esta revista de Filosofía sobre el asunto y en torno a un libro sobre el tema .

 

 desfilenazicolor
Julio 2016

Revista de Libros

El Heidegger secreto y los judíos

La interpretación de Peter Trawny, en contexto

Peter Trawny
Heidegger y el mito de la conspiración mundial de los judíos
Barcelona, Herder, 2015
Trad. de Raúl Gabás
176 pp. 16,90 €

1. El caso Heidegger

Como nadie ignora, Martin Heidegger (18891976) es considerado por gran parte de quienes se dedican al estudio y el cultivo de la filosofía como uno de los pensadores más creativos e influyentes del siglo XX. No pocos lo señalan incluso como el pensador más decisivo de su tiempo y como el último de los grandes representantes de la tradición filosófica occidental. Ecos de su pensamiento se extienden mucho más allá de los límites de la filosofía. Resultan claramente perceptibles, de diversos modos, en el ámbito de disciplinas como la crítica literaria, la lingüística, la psicología, la antropología, la sociología y la teología, por citar los ejemplos más obvios. Pero también artistas, arquitectos e incluso científicos de reconocido prestigio han creído encontrar impulsos inspiradores en su obra y, mientras Heidegger aún vivía, han buscado, en ocasiones, el diálogo personal con el filósofo, que parecía abrir caminos de pensamiento inexplorados y llenos de sugerencias, incluso para aquellos que no poseían una competencia filosófica del tipo que proporciona el cultivo sistemático de la filosofía académica.

En el ámbito de la propia filosofía académica, y en diversos medios culturales, desde Europa hasta Asia, pasando por Latinoamérica, la presencia y la influencia de Heidegger alcanzaron cotas altísimas, hasta el punto de dar lugar, en muchas ocasiones, a formas decadentes, cuando no grotescas, de la obsecuencia dogmática y el culto a la personalidad. Por el mismo motiv, las virulentas reacciones contra Heidegger y el heideggerianismo, no menos frecuentes, respondieron, en muchos casos, no sólo a la dificultad, la oscuridad y, eventualmente, la inaceptabilidad de un pensamiento tan exigente como pretencioso, sino también, y tal vez en mayor medida, a los rasgos más salientes y más irritantes del tipo de seguimiento, poco menos que ciego, que parecía motivar en muchos que se entregaban, sin más, al poder de su influjo. La paradoja fue que, como suele ocurrir en estos casos, el rechazo del pensamiento y la figura de Heidegger presentó, con mucha frecuencia, rasgos muy semejantes a los que mostraba la adhesión ciega contra la cual iba principalmente dirigido.

Un tono diferente, radicalmente agudizado, adquirió la controversia, sin embargo, cuando, más allá de las oposiciones o pseudooposiciones filosóficas más habituales –por ejemplo, entre clásicos y modernos, realistas e idealistas, metafísicos y positivistas, racionalistas e historicistas, absolutistas y relativistas, etc.–, lo que adquirió protagonismo central en la discusión fue la cuestión relativa a la actitud de Heidegger frente a los terribles acontecimientos históricos de su tiempo y, en particular, su relación con el nacionalsocialismo. Así, contra la pretensión del propio Heidegger de desaparecer detrás de su obra, la relación entre la vida y el pensamiento o, al menos, una parte particularmente importante y penosa de ella quedaba situada, por primera vez, en el centro de la atención. Diversos hechos que involucraron a Heidegger con el nacionalsocialismo y con su fallida actuación como rector de la Universidad de Friburgo entre 1933 y 1934 eran ampliamente conocidos, por así decir, desde siempre. Denuncias como las de Karl Löwith, primero, y Jürgen Habermas, después, habían adquirido notoriedad, ya en vida de Heidegger, sin dar lugar, sin embargo, a un debate generalizado sobre el alcance de su filosofía y la naturaleza de sus vinculaciones con el movimiento político en el cual el filósofo, como muchos otros intelectuales, había depositado sus esperanzas de regeneración nacional a comienzos de los años treinta. Fue sólo hacia finales de los años ochenta cuando la controversia alcanzó el carácter radicalizado y generalizado que ahora muestra. Como nadie ignora, el desencadenante lo proporcionó la publicación en 1987, en francés, del polémico libro del chileno Víctor Farías titulado Heidegger y el nacionalsocialismo, cuya versión alemana, aparecida en 1989, fue prologada por el propio Habermas1. Pero el contexto más amplio en que se inscribió la aparición del libro, y que explica buena parte de su resonancia, al menos en Alemania, venía dado por la llamada «controversia de los historiadores» (Historikerstreit) sobre la singularidad del Holocausto de 19861987, en la que Habermas desempeñó un papel central como contradictor de Ernst Nolte, quien en 1980 había sugerido una comparación de los crímenes en masa del nacionalsocialismo con el sistema soviético de los gulag.

Habermas quiso ver en comparaciones de este tipo la expresión de un «revisionismo histórico» destinado a restaurar la conciencia nacional alemana, liberándola de la carga de su pasado, por la vía de una relativización de lo que sería su impronta única e irrepetible desde el punto de vista moral. La repentina caída del muro de Berlín en 1989 y la posterior reunificación alemana, llevada a cabo a una velocidad sorprendente, dieron lugar a un contexto de discusión completamente transformado, en el cual los temores frente a una restauración de la conciencia nacional alemana, lejos de desvanecerse, se incrementaron de forma dramática, al menos en quienes mantenían un punto de vista cercano al expresado por Habermas.

Desde los tiempos de la publicación del libro de Farías, que dio lugar a un amplísimo debate en el que participaron voces autorizadísimas y también otras muchas menos autorizadas, la discusión acerca de si existe o no una vinculación esencial entre el pensamiento filosófico de Heidegger y su compromiso con el nacionalsocialismo ya nunca cesó del todo, aunque, como es obvio, no mantuvo siempre la misma intensidad. Una nueva agudización se produjo en 2005 con la aparición del libro, poco menos que incendiario, de Emmanuel Faye, quien denuncia el pensamiento de Heidegger como la lisa y llana introducción del nazismo en la filosofía y aboga, sin más, por la exclusión de sus obras de las aulas y las bibliotecas universitarias2. Lo que adquirió mayor relieve en esta nueva fase de la controversia no fue simplemente la cuestión del nazismo, sino también, y más específicamente, la del antisemitismo, o, si se prefiere, el antijudaísmo. En este punto, y sobre la base de interpretaciones, cuando menos, altamente discutibles de escritos y cursos de los años 19331935, Faye no sólo atribuye a Heidegger una burda ideología antijudía, en la misma línea de Hitler, y aventura conjeturas sobre la supuesta proximidad del filósofo al círculo de colaboradores más cercanos al Führer (por ejemplo, a Joseph Goebbels), sino que, desde el punto de vista estrictamente filosófico, va incluso más allá: Faye sostiene que la filosofía de Heidegger, superadas las apariencias de juego meramente especulativo, no sería, en rigor, otra cosa que una doctrina criminal destinada a propugnar la guerra de exterminio contra el enemigo judío, cuya trasposición a la realidad conduciría, por tanto, necesariamente al Holocausto.

Los defensores de Heidegger habían argumentado tradicionalmente que el compromiso del filósofo con el nacionalsocialismo, innegable y penoso en sí mismo, era completamente ajeno a la adopción de toda forma identificable de antijudaísmo, y habían intentado interpretar de modo más o menos deflacionario las evidencias textuales, hasta entonces relativamente escasas, que pudieran sugerir lo contrario, porque, por otro lado, contaban con unas cuantas evidencias textuales que hablaban en favor de su propia interpretación, y también con hechos acreditados y testimonios personales que apoyaban con suficiente claridad la conclusión deseada por ellos. Frente a esta estrategia ampliamente difundida, de intención en mayor o menor medida mitigadora, la posición de Faye venía a representar algo así como el extremo opuesto: se trataba, en efecto, de una posición tan hiperbólicamente inflacionaria que difícilmente podía tomarse en serio, al menos en su pretensión más general. En este sentido, y por paradójico que pudiera sonar, Faye resultaba ser un adversario relativamente cómodo, precisamente en razón de su enconada agresividad y su, por momentos, notoria falta de ecuanimidad hermenéutica. Sin embargo, no estaba dicha la última palabra: la publicación de los Cuadernos negros vino a alterar drásticamente el panorama antes descrito.

2. Los Cuadernos negros

Entre marzo de 2014 y marzo de 2015 se publicaron en el marco de la «edición integral» (Gesamtausgabe) de los escritos de Heidegger cuatro volúmenes, numerados del 94 al 97, que contienen un vastísimo conjunto de anotaciones realizadas a lo largo de casi dos décadas, más concretamente entre 1931 y 1948, que, compiladas, dan lugar a un total de más de mil setecentas páginas. Se trata de anotaciones privadas en cuadernos, denominados «negros» por el propio Heidegger, que éste, en principio, no pretendía dar a conocer, pero cuya publicación finalmente consintió, a mediados de los años setenta, en el marco de las etapas preliminares encaminadas a dar forma al proyecto de la Gesamtausgabe, que, según el plan de edición vigente, configura un monumental corpus de 102 volúmenes. Lo hizo, sin embargo, con la exigencia expresa de que esos extraños cuadernos fueran publicados sólo al final, es decir, una vez completada la tarea de edición del resto de los volúmenes, una tarea que ya desde el comienzo se preveía ardua y muy prolongada en el tiempo. Mientras tanto, los manuscritos de los Cuadernos negros deberían permanecer en estricto secreto. Ahora bien, esta disposición expresa de Heidegger no fue respetada por los administradores de su legado manuscrito, que, como se sabe, son familiares directos del filósofo y colaboradores muy cercanos a él. Peter Trawny, autor del libro que es objeto de este comentario y cumplidísimo editor de varios otros volúmenes de la Gesamtausgabe, recibió entonces este particular encargo de edición.

Como no podía ser de otra manera, la decisión de no respetar la disposición expresa de Heidegger ha llamado poderosamente la atención del público especializado, sobre todo porque contrasta fuertemente con la política previa, mantenida a rajatabla, de una alegada fidelidad total a lo que habrían sido los deseos expresos del filósofo. Esa misma política de fidelidad, ahora quebrantada, había proporcionado en el pasado la justificación para decisiones, restricciones y reglas procedimentales en ocasiones difícilmente aceptables desde el punto de vista de las exigencias de cientificidad que plantea la propia labor de edición, por no mencionar las que tienen que ver específicamente con el libre ejercicio de la tarea de investigación y crítica3 . En el presente caso, sin embargo, el propio Trawny ha creído poder justificar la decisión de los administradores apelando a «buenas razones», vinculadas con lo que sería la crucial importancia del texto de los Cuadernos negros, sobre el cual llega incluso a preguntarse si no constituye acaso el verdadero «legado filosófico» de Heidegger, cuya publicación el filósofo habría querido retardar, justamente, en virtud de su especial importancia (p. 17).

La sugerencia, formulada retóricamente a modo de pregunta, guarda estrecha relación con la interpretación que Trawny desarrolla en su libro. Sin embargo, pienso que una simple inspección superficial del contenido de los cuatro volúmenes resulta más que suficiente para comprender que se hace realmente muy difícil poder tomarla demasiado en serio. En efecto, un lector desprejuiciado muy difícilmente podría descubrir en este conjunto, no siempre internamente conexo, de anotaciones, referidas a todo un vasto conjunto de asuntos y temas diversos y dispersas a lo largo de casi veinte años, un «legado filosófico» de «especial importancia», que proporcionara algo así como la clave para entender el conjunto de la obra de Heidegger. Más bien todo hace pensar que el propio Heidegger consideraba, no sin razón, que estas anotaciones, lejos de suministrar una llave maestra para la comprensión de todo lo demás, sólo podían ser adecuadamente comprendidas y valoradas en su alcance y su importancia –también en lo que toca a lo mucho que contienen en materia de toma de posición frente a acontecimientos de la época– sobre la base del enorme conjunto de escritos, de diverso tipo, que debían publicarse con anterioridad. Esta suposición se compadece mejor, por otra parte, con la reticencia que, en general, Heidegger puso reiteradamente de manifiesto a la hora de dar a conocer sus escritos no publicados, convencido como estaba de que la época no estaba ni remotamente madura para comprender cabalmente su pensamiento: si esto valía, en general, para textos internamente muchos más conexos, como son los de las lecciones y otros manuscritos no dados a publicidad, ¿qué no podría decirse entonces de las anotaciones contenidas en los Cuadernos negros?

En cualquier caso, parece claro que el adelanto de la publicación de unos escritos destinados por el propio autor para ser dados a conocer sólo al final de un larguísimo proceso editorial denota un género de apresuramiento que resulta completamente ajeno a la actitud propugnada por el propio Heidegger. ¿Es demasiado aventurado pensar que razones diferentes de las alegadas, y seguramente bastante más pedestres, pueden haber desempeñado un papel no desdeñable en la motivación de un cambio de actitud tan drástico por parte de los administradores del legado manuscrito? La sospecha, me temo, no puede aventarse con excesiva facilidad. Y, en este particular contexto, tampoco resulta fácil dejar de evocar la campaña publicitaria lanzada con motivo de la publicación, en 1989, de las famosas Contribuciones a la filosofía (Beiträge zur Philosophie), de 19361938, contenidas en el tomo 65 de la Gesamtausgabe. Se las presentó entonces, pomposa e insistentemente, como la «segunda obra capital» (zweites Hauptwerk) del genial autor de Ser y tiempo: la obra, mantenida deliberadamente en secreto, en la cual se alumbraba nada menos que el nuevo y pretendidamente decisivo pensamiento del «evento» o «acontecimiento» (Ereignis). Quede reservada a una posteridad menos condicionada por los debates del presente la tarea de enjuiciar la validez de asertos tan pretenciosos como los que acompañaron a estos sucesos editoriales, separados entre sí por casi un cuarto de siglo, pero ambos tan singulares. Una cosa al menos es segura: si se compara todo esto con el trámite relativamente aburrido para el observador exterior que supuso, a lo largo de muchas décadas, la publicación de los tomos de la Husserliana, una edición crítica de la que puede decirse que realmente satisface estándares exigibles de rigor científico, se hace aún más patente lo peculiar y contrastante del caso de la Gesamtausgabe, y se comprende también un poco mejor por qué razón las denuncias de escándalo, en este caso, no siempre se vincularon primariamente con aspectos referidos al pensamiento de Heidegger, sino que apuntaron ya, antes de toda consideración de contenido, a los propios procedimientos implementados en la tarea de edición.

Comoquiera que sea, desde el punto de vista del contenido y el estilo, los textos contenidos en los Cuadernos negros no pueden ser fácilmente clasificados. La sugerencia del propio Trawny de que se trataría de una suerte de «diario de pensamiento» (Denktagebuch) (véase las consideraciones del editor en  Gesamtausgabe 94, p. 530; 95, p. 448; 96, p. 278; 97, p. 519) no parece muy acertada. Más bien pareciera que lo que hay que decir es que se trata simplemente de «reflexiones» (Überlegungen) (Gesamtausgabe 94, 95 y 96) y «anotaciones» (Anmerkungen) (Gesamtausgabe 97), que es, por otra parte, como el propio autor las denomina, de diversa extensión y orientación temática. En el caso de algunos de los textos más tempranos, Heidegger habla también de «guiños» (Winke). Tampoco parece guardar una adecuada correspondencia con las características dominantes de los textos la sugerencia de Trawny de que se trataría de «estudios filosóficos elaborados», que, dada la ausencia de correcciones en el original, supondrían indudablemente la existencia trabajos previos, no conservados (p. 17). Lo que se seguiría de esto último sería, a lo sumo, que los textos fueron pasados a limpio y corregidos en alguna medida. Pero no se sigue, en cambio, que estuvieran concebidos al modo de «estudios filosóficos elaborados», ni mucho menos que estuvieran puestos todos ellos al servicio de un desarrollo temático unitario, aunque resulta indudablemente cierto que, en su mayor parte, se organizan en torno a temas, problemas y motivos característicos del pensamiento heideggeriano de la época del llamado «giro» (Kehre).

Dadas las características de material textual con que nos enfrentamos, nada podría haber hecho pensar que los cuatro volúmenes que lo contienen hubieran podido encontrar un eco tan inmediato y tan extendido como el que de hecho tuvieron. La explicación de esta sorprendente circunstancia tiene que ver, como se sabe, con la presencia de un conjunto de pasajes, relativamente reducido, que contienen referencias directas al judaísmo y los judíos de un carácter, en algunos casos, problemático y, en otros, a todas luces, inaceptable, cuando no sencillamente penoso y hasta grotesco. En razón de esos pasajes, el texto de los Cuadernos negros atrajo de inmediato la curiosidad de todo el mundo y la obra se situó de golpe en el ojo del huracán. A la sorprendente inmediatez, la inusitada intensidad y la inevitable unilateralidad que mostró la amplia recepción de la obra contribuyó también, de modo significativo, el hecho de que, en su calidad de editor, el propio Trawny juzgó conveniente dar a conocer de modo oficioso algunos de los pasajes más irritantes, que citó e hizo circular en círculos heideggerianos de París ya en 2013, bastante antes de la aparición de la obra. Como se ve, la publicación de los Cuadernos negros fue objeto de un curioso doble anticipo, que delata urgencias un tanto llamativas.

3. La interpretación de Trawny

De modo paralelo a la aparición de los primeros tres volúmenes de los Cuadernos negros, en marzo de 2014, Trawny publicó la primera edición de su libro, que a estas alturas ya va por la tercera. La versión española, debida a Raúl Gabás, se basa en esta última edición, que contiene dos capítulos adicionales respecto de la primera, uno de ellos añadido ya en la segunda, y también los nuevos epílogos incorporados sucesivamente en la segunda y la tercera. Es una versión muy legible y ágil, que puede calificarse, en general, de precisa. Contiene, sin embargo, alguna inconsistencia en el vocabulario, algún error relevante y también varias erratas menores4.

Lo que Trawny ensaya en el libro no es una presentación de conjunto de la temática de los Cuadernos negros, sino una interpretación centrada en los pasajes que conciernen a los judíos y el judaísmo. La tesis principal de Trawny consiste en atribuir a Heidegger una forma peculiarísima de antijudaísmo, cuya especificidad vendría dada por su conexión intrínseca con los temas que dominan el pensamiento de Heidegger durante esos años, a saber: la así llamada «historia del ser» o, si se prefiere, «ontohistoria» (Seinsgeschichte, Geschichte des Seins). Así, Trawny atribuye a Heidegger un «antisemistismo ontohistórico» (seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemitismus). Más preciso hubiera sido hablar de «antijudaísmo ontohistórico» y así lo haré en lo que sigue, aunque me aparte con ello de la terminología de Trawny5. Se trataría de un antijudaísmo que, si bien no afecta de igual modo a la totalidad de la filosofía de Heidegger, la contamina y difumina, así, sus márgenes: pensamientos que hasta ahora parecían neutrales aparecerían ahora bajo otra luz (p. 15). Consciente de su peculiarísima naturaleza, y para evitar las confusiones, Heidegger habría mantenido su antijudaísmo en total secreto, ocultándolo incluso a los nacionalsocialistas (p. 19). La publicación de los Cuadernos negros lo pondría, pues, al descubierto por vez primera.

Trawny desarrolla la parte nuclear de su argumentación en cuatro pasos, a saber: primero ofrece un breve bosquejo del «paisaje de la historia del ser», en el cual se sitúa el «antijudaísmo ontohistórico» (pp. 2136); en segundo lugar, caracteriza los principales tipos de tal forma de antijudaísmo (pp. 3769); luego discute el papel que Heidegger otorga al concepto de raza (pp. 7183); y, finalmente, examina lo que sería la ambivalente actitud de Heidegger frente a lo extraño (pp. 8595). Comento muy brevemente estos puntos.

1) El núcleo narrativo de la concepción heideggeriana de la «historia del ser» reside, a juicio de Trawny, en la contraposición de dos «comienzos», a saber: el comienzo griego, que da lugar al desarrollo que concluye en la «construcción/producción sistematizada» de la técnica planetaria, por un lado, y el «nuevo comienzo», que adviene con el pensar no metafísico del ser como «evento» o «acontecimiento» (Ereignis) (pp. 26 y ss.). Esta contraposición, llevada a su extremo, daría lugar, piensa Trawny, a un «maniqueísmo ontohistórico» (seinsgeschichtlicher Manichäismus), que conduce a una oposición polar entre ser y ente, como extremos entre los cuales se produce una decisión excluyente (pp. 28 y ss.). Tal sería la atmósfera enrarecida en la que se mueve el pensamiento de Heidegger desde finales de los años treinta, sin conocer todavía las importantes matizaciones introducidas posteriormente, una vez concluida la guerra (pp. 29 y ss.). Los griegos son receptores del encargo del primer comienzo, mientras que el nuevo comienzo es el encargo que reciben los alemanes (p. 33). Los judíos, señala Trawny, se añaden a estos dos colectivos (p. 33), con lo cual busca sugerir, desde el principio, que los judíos desempeñarían un papel comparable en la narrativa ontohistórica. Sobre esta base, la relación con el nacionalsocialismo real es compleja: hay un momento de cercanía que permanece constante hasta el final de la guerra y que constituye, a la vez, una distancia insalvable que se refleja, entre otras cosas, en la severa crítica de Heidegger al biologismo y la absolutización del concepto de raza desde finales de los años treinta (pp. 34 y ss.). En último término, el nacionalsocialismo queda incluido en la órbita del pensar metafísico que ha de ser superado, de modo que ya no forma parte del «nuevo comienzo» (pp. 35 y ss.).

2) Trawny distingue tres tipos de «antijudaísmo ontohistórico» que, lejos de ser formas especialmente refinadas, no harían más que codificar en clave filosófica creencias vulgares. El primero vendría dado por la asociación del judaísmo con una racionalidad basada primaria o exclusivamente en la capacidad de cálculo, para la cual los judíos estarían especialmente dotados (pp. 37 y ss.). La «carencia de mundo» (Weltlosigkeit) propia de los judíos estaría conectada con su particular tenacidad en la habilitad de cálculo, que facilita el desplazamiento y la mezcolanza (Gesamtausgabe, 95, p. 97, núm. 5). En tal sentido, explica Trawny, los judíos serían especiales actores de la ontohistoria en cuanto que representarían paradigmáticamente una de las formas más antiguas de la «maquinación» o «construcción/producción sistematizada». La vulgar asociación del judaísmo con el cálculo y el dinero, de larga tradición, queda así investida de dignidad ontohistórica (pp. 42 y ss.).

El segundo tipo de «antijudaísmo ontohistórico» consiste en la creencia de que los judíos son quienes han vivido ellos mismos desde siempre según el principio racial, razón por la cual se opondrían decididamente a su aplicación generalizada y favorecerían, en cambio, el desarraigo de todos los pueblos, tal como este se produce en la lógica interna de despliegue de la «maquinación» o «construcción/producción sistematizada» (pp. 38 y ss.; véase también Gesamtausgabe, 96, p. 56, núm. 38). Aquí Trawny subraya el rechazo de Heidegger al pensamiento racial, cuya ideología constructivista no brota de la vida misma, pero afirma que dicho rechazo no supone el abandono del concepto de raza, sino su conservación como una condición necesaria del Dasein histórico, arrojado en su facticidad (pp. 47 y ss.). El reproche de Heidegger a los judíos consistiría aquí en haber aplicado desde tiempo inmemorial lo mismo que los nacionalsocialistas aplicaban ahora ilimitadamente con sus leyes raciales (p. 51): desde el punto de vista ontohistórico, la confrontación entre nacionalsocialistas y judíos se produce, pues, sobre un suelo común compartido (pp. 52 y ss.).

El tercer tipo de «antijudaísmo ontohistórico» viene dado por la creencia en la existencia de una función peculiar del «judaísmo mundial» como representante paradigmático de la humanidad sin arraigo ni vinculación, dentro del marco de la confrontación entre «americanismo» y «bolchevismo» (p. 39). Trawny recuerda que, en una conversación sobre los «Protocolos de los sabios de Sión» –una falsificación de gran circulación en la época, que tuvo su origen en conexión con el caso Dreyfus y de la que Hitler era considerado un ferviente seguidor–, Heidegger había expresado ante Jaspers su creencia en que existía, sin embargo, una «peligrosa unión internacional de los judíos» (p. 54)6. Trawny piensa que la ficción del dominio judío del mundo actual pudo proporcionar el punto de partida de la visión de Heidegger que situaba la confrontación de los nacionalsocialistas y los judíos en un mismo plano desde el punto de vista ontohistórico (pp. 55 y ss.), y que presentaba a los judíos como un enemigo imperceptible, presente en todas partes (pp. 59 y ss.; véase también Gesamtausgabe, 96, p. 262, núm. 9). En esa lucha, sin embargo, lo carente de suelo terminaría por aniquilarse también a sí mismo (p. 66), y ello, en definitiva, a través del «americanismo», que culminaría en el nihilismo (p. 68) y en el cual radicaría «todo lo funesto» por ser incapaz de un «nuevo comienzo» (p. 69).

3) En su discusión del papel que desempeña el concepto de raza, Trawny sostiene que la apropiación practicada por Heidegger busca retenerlo, mitigando al mismo tiempo la inflexión biologista dominante en el empleo por parte de los nacionalsocialistas. Según esto, Heidegger no rechazaría la conexión con la dimensión de «la sangre», es decir, con lo biológico y hereditario, pero pondría el énfasis más bien en la vinculación con el uso valorativo de la expresión, presente en expresiones en las que «tener raza», «ser alguien o algo de raza» o «mostrar raza» aluden al «rango», la «clase» o la «categoría» de algo, en el sentido de su calidad o excelencia (pp. 73 y ss.). Algo análogo sucede con la noción de autoctonía tal y como entra en la ideología de «sangre y suelo»: se trata de dimensiones que, en tanto remiten al origen, pertenecen al «ser arrojado» del Dasein, que condiciona su carácter esencialmente proyectivo (pp. 76 y ss.), pero que no sustituye dicho carácter, ni en el plano individual ni en el colectivo. Por lo mismo, tampoco la pertenencia a un «pueblo» queda decidida simplemente de ese modo, ya que sólo puede recibir su significación auténtica en y desde un determinado proyecto histórico. Dentro de este marco interpretativo, la distancia crítica con la concepción oficial del nacionalsocialismo, con su inflexión eminentemente biologista, va acentuándose crecientemente con el correr de los años (pp. 77 y ss.), porque, en definitiva, todo pensamiento racial no es otra cosa que una manifestación de la concepción moderna de la subjetividad (pp. 79 y ss.). Paradójicamente, señala Trawny en uno de los momentos más agudos de su interpretación, es esto último lo que facilita la ubicación de los judíos como representantes paradigmáticos del pensar calculador dentro la narrativa ontohistórica, justamente en la medida en que serían ellos quienes habrían vivido desde siempre según el principio racial (pp. 81 y ss.).

4) Finalmente, Trawny considera la actitud de Heidegger frente al fenómeno de lo extraño, en el sentido de lo ajeno y foráneo (fremd, das Fremde). Aquí Trawny contrasta lo que sería una actitud positiva frente a lo extraño, en el plano que concierne al ser y a su indisponibilidad en su carácter radical de evento o acontecimiento, por un lado (pp. 87 y ss.), con un evidente recelo frente a lo extraño y no autóctono, en el plano del ente, por otro (pp. 89 y ss.). Este último rasgo adquiere una sintomática agudización allí donde se trata de enfatizar el carácter deletéreo de toda identidad que poseería todo aquello que carece de arraigo, muy particularmente a la hora de poner de relieve el riesgo al que se ve expuesto el destino de los alemanes, caracterizado en términos románticos como «el pueblo de los pensadores y los poetas» (pp. 92 y ss.).

Con esto he ofrecido una somera presentación de lo que, a mi modo de ver, constituye el núcleo de la interpretación ofrecida por Trawny. Los restantes cuatro capítulos, dedicados a la actitud frente a Husserl (pp. 97110), a la relación entre vida y obra (pp. 111116), al motivo de la (auto)aniquilación (pp. 117131) y a la actitud mantenida tras el desvelamiento del Holocausto, donde desempeña un papel central la figura de Hannah Arendt (pp. 133151), incluyen una serie de consideraciones complementarias y corolarios que no puedo comentar aquí en detalle. Me limito a un par de observaciones más generales.

El tratamiento de los casos de Husserl y Arendt forma parte, a mi modo de ver, de los momentos menos logrados de toda la obra. En el caso de Husserl, Trawny se afana por mostrar que, además de las diferencias filosóficas y los conflictos personales, el distanciamiento crítico de Heidegger respecto de la versión husserliana de la fenomenología incluiría también la caracterización de esta última como una forma de pensamiento judío, es decir, como expresión de la habilidad para el mero pensar calculador (pp. 103 y ss.; véanse también pp. 38 y 46 y ss.). Hasta donde alcanzo a ver, no hay ninguna evidencia textual que avale este aserto. Por el contrario, la alegada por Trawny habla incluso claramente en el sentido contrario, en la medida en que atribuye a Husserl el logro duradero de haber hecho posible la superación de formas paradigmáticas del reduccionismo naturalista, como el psicologismo y el historicismo7. En el caso de Arendt, por su parte, la presentación de Trawny resulta, en general, algo más convincente, pero contiene algunos puntos insalvables. Por ejemplo, en relación con la historia de la posible venta del original de Ser y tiempo a una biblioteca norteamericana en 1969, ¿era inevitable interpretar la petición de ayuda de Elfride Petri, la mujer de Heidegger, a Arendt para que averiguara un precio adecuado como una suerte de revelación indirecta de la atribución a los judíos de una especial sagacidad en asuntos monetarios? (p. 136). En cuanto al tratamiento de la relación entre vida y obra, puede decirse que apunta, fundamentalmente, a explicar el hecho reconocido de la proximidad de Heidegger a un amplio grupo de colegas y discípulos judíos, y lo hace con referencia al tipo de explicación que posibilitaría la categoría de «judíos de excepción», por contraste con el enemigo colectivo y anónimo, imperceptible, pero presente en todas partes (pp. 115 y ss.).

Mención especial merece, por último, el tratamiento del fenómeno de la (auto)aniquilación. Aquí aparece un cuadro que la precedente focalización en el motivo del antijudaísmo no permitía percibir en todo su alcance. En efecto, Trawny centra ahora su atención en la conexión que dicho motivo mantiene con toda una serie de elementos referidos a otras colectividades étnicas y otras configuraciones históricas, tales como Rusia o lo ruso, Inglaterra, el americanismo, el marxismo, el bolchevismo, el cristianismo, lo chinesco, lo asiático. Trawny cree poder asignar al judaísmo una particular centralidad en la concepción de Heidegger dentro de la dinámica de destrucción y (auto)aniquilación que configura el despliegue de la lógica interna de la «maquinación» o «construcción/producción sistematizada»: el judaísmo no sería otra cosa que la reducción apocalíptica misma (p. 120), que en Auschwitz llega finalmente a la autoaniquilación (p. 131). Sin embargo, el propio Trawny asume que el embate de Heidegger se dirige en rigor en estos años contra las tres formas más paradigmáticas de universalismo, históricamente determinadas: judaísmo, platonismo y cristianismo (p. 127). Esto no le impide, sin embargo, mantener su decisión hermenéutica de situar el motivo antijudío en el centro de su reconstrucción interpretativa, una decisión sobre cuya base puede incluso especular que, para Heidegger, nacionalsocialismo, americanismo, anglicismo y bolchevismo, a los que habría que añadir probablemente el cristianismo y no sé si incluso el platonismo, vendrían a configurar formas de expresión de «lo judío», identificado ahora sin residuo alguno con la «maquinación» o «construcción/producción sistematizada». Sólo sobre esta base puede alcanzar Trawny la conclusión de que el pensamiento de Heidegger representa una aniquilación de los aniquilados en Ausschwitz, en cuanto que piensa en esta aniquilación como una autoaniquilación (p. 130 s.).

Dejo al lector la tarea de evaluar la verosimilitud de esta última construcción interpretativa, para la cual, a mi modo de ver, ya no puede reclamarse ningún apoyo textual que pudiera avalarla en su pretensión más general. En todo caso, a la luz de la violencia interpretativa que se pone de manifiesto en este paso, me resulta difícil evitar la pregunta de si, en ocasiones, la aniquilación, real o supuesta, a la que somete el pensamiento filosófico aquello que piensa, no recibe, en el plano de la interpretación que debería aspirar a hacerle justicia, un pago con la misma moneda.

4. Observación final

En los «intentos de respuesta» con los que se cierra la obra (pp. 153165), Trawny sugiere que el «maniqueísmo ontohistórico» que proporciona el marco para el antijudaísmo que se revela en los Cuadernos negros quedaría posteriormente superado al llegar Heidegger a una nueva comprensión de la relación entre ser y ente y, con ello, también de la esencia de la técnica, tal como ésta se pone de manifiesto en los escritos posteriores al fin de la guerra. Sugiere, además, la posibilidad de que la decisión de Heidegger de dar a conocer el texto de los Cuadernos negros pudiera responder a su intención de mostrar hasta qué punto su pensamiento del ser se vio expuesto al extravío (pp. 158 y ss.). La pertinencia de estos intentos mitigadores depende, como es obvio, de la corrección del diagnóstico de Trawny referido al alcance de la posición contenida en el texto de los Cuadernos negros. Pero, en su pretensión más general, tal diagnóstico no puede sino generar serias dudas, pues existen indicios sólidos de que la focalización poco menos que excluyente en el motivo del «antijudaísmo ontológico» trae consigo una suerte de efecto lupa que, en último término, distorsiona fuertemente las proporciones del conjunto.

En cuanto a la posición del propio Heidegger, no deja de sorprender el modo en que combina su elevadísima pretensión de esencialidad con una asombrosa dependencia de generalizaciones empíricas carentes de toda fiabilidad, cuando no completamente simplistas, y con una ausencia de rigor histórico por momentos escalofriante. Sus referencias a lo que sería la esencia y el papel histórico de toda una serie de entidades colectivas altamente difusas, representadas de modo cuasihipostasiado como fuerzas históricas operantes, se mueven, con asombrosa frecuencia, en el plano que corresponde a un discurso groseramente vulgar, alimentado de generalizaciones no acreditadas, cuando no de prejuicios ajenos a toda crítica racional. Esto vale también, y muy especialmente, para el caso de la mayor parte de las referencias antijudías contenidas en los Cuadernos negros. No parece poder evitarse, por tanto, la conclusión de que, más allá de las muchas diferencias con las formas de antijudaísmo más habituales, en especial las basadas en la ideología de la sangre y el suelo propagada por los nacionalsocialistas, Heidegger no dudó en incorporar en su propio discurso diversos motivos característicos de formas tradicionales del antijudaísmo europeo. No es seguro que esto último baste para tildar a Heidegger, sin más, de un simple representante de esas formas de antijudaísmo, ya que su propia posición queda impostada finalmente en un nivel de reflexión completamente diferente. Pero tampoco puede haber duda, a mi modo de ver, de que su adopción acrítica de una serie de prejuicios característicos lo sitúa, en la práctica, en la cercanía de esas mismas formas de antijudaísmo. La pretensión de superarlas en clave ontohistórica no hace, en definitiva, más que sublimarlas, sin eliminarlas, y, con ello, contribuye también, quiérase o no, a legitimarlas.

Ahora bien, y más allá de toda posible matización ulterior, cabe primero preguntarse: ¿no constituye acaso una lección inolvidable en el arte de la autorrefutación pragmática el hecho de que el filósofo del ser que, con exuberante derroche de brillantez, ha puesto de manifiesto la tendencia anclada en el Dasein a someterse al imperio de la habladuría, termine por construir él mismo un pensamiento de alcance pretendidamente ontohistórico, pero apoyado acríticamente en gran medida en un conjunto de «ismos» que escapan a toda posible acreditación fenomenológica? Desde este punto de vista, la lectura de muchos pasajes de los Cuadernos negros que irradian una arbitrariedad tosca e irritante, por muy desagradable que pueda resultar, no deja de ser una experiencia importante, incluso imprescindible, para quienes se interesan verdaderamente por el pensamiento de Heidegger. En efecto, ayuda a comprender que también aquí, como en tantos otros casos, el único camino transitable no puede ser sino el del cultivo de una actitud ajena a todo fanatismo dogmático, sea de corte defensivo o condenatorio. Sólo así se estará en condiciones de adoptar una perspectiva de serena distancia, que permita aprender no sólo de los muchos y admirables aciertos de un filósofo extraordinariamente creativo y penetrante, sino también de sus errores y desvaríos, en ocasiones, espeluznantes.

Alejandro G. Vigo es profesor de Filosofía en la Universidad de Navarra. Sus últimos libros son Estudios aristotélicos (Barañaín, Eunsa, 2006; 2º ed. corr., 2011) y Juicio, experiencia, verdad. De la lógica de la validez a la fenomenología (Barañaín, Eunsa, 2013).

20/06/2016

1. Víctor Farías, Heidegger et le nazisme, trad. francesa de Myriam Benarroch y Jean-Baptiste Grasset, Lagrasse, Verdier, 1987; Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus, trad. alemana de Klaus Laermann, Fráncfort, Fischer, 1989. Ambos son traducciones del original español, Heidegger y el nazismo, Barcelona, Muchnik, 1989.
2. Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger, Lʼintroduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. Autour des séminaires inédits de 1933-1935, París, Albin Michel 2005 (Heidegger. La introducción del nazismo en la filosofía. En torno a los seminarios inéditos de 1933-1935, trad. de Óscar Moro, Madrid 2009). Para una detallada réplica a la interpretación de Faye, sobre la base de la evidencia textual disponible hasta entonces, véase la obra de Holger Zaborowski, Eine Frage von Irre und Schuld? Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus, Fráncfort, Fischer, 2010.
3. A este respecto, basta mencionar la durísima denuncia realizada hace ya veinte años por un especialista de la talla de Theodore Kissiel.Véase Theodore Kissiel, «Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. An International Scandal of Scholarship», Philosophy Today, vol. 39, núm. 1 (1995), pp. 3-15. Véase también la reciente toma de posición de Peter Trawny, quien ha revelado incluso un caso de eliminación dudosamente justificada de un texto comprometido en 1997, en el cual el propio Trawny reconoce haber tenido participación como editor de Gesamtausgabe, 69, al ceder a determinadas presiones. Véase Peter Trawny, «Martin Heidegger und seine Gesamtausgabe. Die letzte Hand des Zauberers». A lo largo de todo 2015 se sucedieron las discusiones y las tomas de posición sobre este espinoso asunto, entre las cuales hay que destacar las correspondientes a la polémica entre Richard Wolin (Nueva York), afamado historiador y politólogo, y Vittorio E. Klostermann, principal representante de la reputada editorial filosófica Vittorio Klostermann, que lleva a cabo la edición de la Gesamtausgabe. El duro intercambio de reproches fue publicado en la revista de filosofía Hohe Luft.
4. En materia de inconsistencias, la más notoria concierne a la traducción del término Machenschaft, que desempeña un papel muy importante a lo largo del texto. El término es difícil de traducir. La traducción más usual en español es «maquinación», o bien «intriga», pero es dudoso que refleje las connotaciones que el término adquiere en el lenguaje de Heidegger. Gabás se inclina por una solución diferente y, en su primera aparición, lo traduce como «construcción sistematizada», colocando, además, el término alemán entre paréntesis (p. 27). Más adelante, la traducción muta, sin embargo, a «producción sistematizada», sin que medie aviso alguno (p. 41 et passim). Por otra parte, un importante error de traducción, o tal vez de imprenta, que puede obstaculizar la comprensión, se encuentra en la página 147, donde, en lugar de «el hablar poético», debería leerse «el hablar profético».
5. Como nadie ignora, el término «semita» se emplea con una extensión mucho mayor que el término «judío» o «hebreo». Se llama «semitas» a diversos pueblos históricos entre los cuales, además de los judíos, se cuentan, por ejemplo, los árabes, los fenicios, los asirios, los babilonios, etc. También se denomina de ese modo a las lenguas habladas por esos pueblos.
6. Como se ha hecho notar, no contamos con ninguna evidencia de que Heidegger leyera los «Protocolos». A esto Trawny replica, en el epílogo a la segunda edición, que su interpretación no atribuye a Heidegger tal lectura, sino que se limita a establecer una conexión, por así decir, atmosférica, en la que los discursos de Hitler habrían desempeñado un papel mediador (p. 163).
7. En particular, la crítica a Husserl en Gesamtausgabe, 96, pp. 44 y ss., núm. 24, por haber pasado por alto la pregunta por el ser y, con ello, por no haber logrado adoptar el punto de vista adecuado en lo concerniente a la decisión fundamental entre el primado del ente y la verdad del ser (p. 47), parte expresamente del reconocimiento a Husserl por haber superado, con su concepción del método fenomenológico, toda «explicación psicológica» (psychologische Erklärung) y todo «recuento histórico de opiniones» (historische Verrechnung von Meinungen; p. 46). En ese sentido, su concepción posee una importancia duradera (bleibende Wichtigkeit) (ibídem).

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Varoufakis/Chomsky video and transcript

April 26, 2016, LIVE from the New York Public Library, http://www.nypl.org/live, Celeste Bartos Forum

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Good evening, we don’t have anyone to introduce us, so I’ve been asked to kick off by saying firstly that isn’t this wonderful that we are all here just to subvert the notion that nothing good can come out of the public sector? (laughter) Noam.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, the fact that I’m here, barely, actually has a relationship to that comment. I came from Boston, my wife and I came from Boston, it took seven hours, and any society that hasn’t been smashed by neoliberal policies of the kind you describe, it would have taken maybe an hour and a half, two hours. (laughter) There is a train, the pride of the public sector, which I took for the first time in 1950, and it’s about fifteen minutes faster now than it was then, (laughter) when it makes the schedule, which is a chancy situation, so we decided to come by airplane and spent most of the afternoon on the runway.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, Noam, what shall we talk about?

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, we can talk about the neoliberal assault on the world’s population in the last generation, which you’ve written so brilliantly about.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: What strikes me given the last quite eventful year of my life, what really strikes me is the major disconnect between the philosophy and ideology of neoliberalism and that which I encountered when negotiating, inverted commas negotiating, when being dictated by the greater good of the neoliberal international financial establishment. Think about it. If you take the great libertarians, the great neoliberals, who castigate all tax-funded activities, and you consider the reason why I’m here today and I’m not still the minister of finance of Greece. Why? It’s because I refused another hundred billion smackers, dollars, of tax-backed loan to my insolvent government, which the creditors insisted that I should take.

NOAM CHOMSKY: The three-year loans.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s astonishing, so here it is, here you have the international monetary fund, the European Central Bank, and the European commission insisting that our bankrupt state takes on another hundred billion, under conditions that guarantee we will not be able to repay the taxpayers of Europe that will be granting us that money, and that comes from neoliberals, who supposedly are against all tax-funded loans to government, and who supposedly believe that an insolvent entity doesn’t have the moral right to take on more loans.

NOAM CHOMSKY: But as you point out, what is it, 90 percent of those loans go to French and German bankers.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: That was the first loan. This loan it would go from the one pocket of the creditors to another pocket of the creditors so they would maintain the pretense that Greece was not bankrupt. But effectively what I’m trying to say is the intense hypocrisy of the neoliberal establishment, which is not really even interested in sticking to its own neoliberal ideology. This is just nineteenth-century power politics of crushing anyone who dares stand up to them and say a simple word, “No.”

NOAM CHOMSKY: But I think that’s actually traditional. One of the paradoxes of neoliberalism is that it’s not new and it’s not liberal.

(applause)

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Exactly. Exactly.

NOAM CHOMSKY: If you look at what you describe is a form of hypocrisy but the same is true of saying that we should not support tax-funded institutions. The financial sector is basically tax-funded.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course.

NOAM CHOMSKY: You recall the IMF study of the leading American banks, which determined that virtually all their profits come from their implicit government insurance policy, cheap credit, access to higher credit ratings, incentives to take risky transactions which are profitable but then if it’s problematic, you guys pay for it, or just take the basis of the contemporary economy, which actually I’ve been privileged to see developing in government-subsidized laboratories for decades. MIT, where I’ve been since the 1950s, is one of the institutions where the government, the funnel in the early days was the Pentagon, was pouring in money to create the basis for the high-tech economy of the future and the profitmaking of the institutions that are regarded as private enterprises. It was decades of work under public funding with a very anticapitalist ideology. So according to capitalist principles, if someone invests in a risky enterprise over a long period and thirty years later it makes some profit, they’re supposed to get part of the profit, but it doesn’t work like that here. It was the taxpayer who invested for decades. The profit goes to Apple and Microsoft, not to the taxpayer.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Indeed, indeed. If you take an iPhone apart, every single technology in it was developed by some government grant, every single one.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And for long periods.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: And some of them by government grants from other countries, like WiFi from the Australian Commonwealth.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And it’s—you see an interesting picture of it from a place like MIT, or other major research institutions. So if you walked around the building where I work fifty years ago, you would have seen electronic firms, Raytheon, ITech, others, IBM, there to essentially rob the technology that’s being developed at public expense and seeing if they can turn it into something applicable for profits. You walk around the institution today, you see different buildings, you see Novartis, Pfizer, other pharmaceutical, big pharmaceutical corporations. Why? Because the cutting edge of the economy has shifted from electronics based to biology based, so therefore the predators in the so-called private sector are there to see what they can pick up from the taxpayer-funded research in the fundamental biological sciences, and that’s called free enterprise and a free-market system. So speak of hypocrisy, it’s pretty hard to go beyond that.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Quite right. This hypocrisy is fundamental to the whole enterprise culture of capitalism from 250 years ago.

NOAM CHOMSKY: From the beginning.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: I mean the whole notion that there can be a market system which is at an arm’s length separated from a state, which is the enemy, is the sickest joke in the history of humankind. If you think that this narrative of private wealth creation which is appropriated by the big bad wolf, the state, on behalf of trade unions and the working class that need a social welfare net, is just a preposterous reversal of the truth that wealth is being created collectively and appropriated privately but right from the beginning. I mean, the enclosures in Britain would never have happened without the king’s army and without state brutality for pushing peasants off their ancestors’ land and creating the commodification of labor, the commodification of land which then gave rise to capitalism. Just half an hour ago, we were being shown, some of us, the magnificent collection of maps of the city of New York in this wonderful building and you could see in one of the maps of Alabama, the precise depiction of the theft of land from Native Americans, the way in which it was parceled up, commodified. Now that would never have happened without the brutal intervention of the state and created the process of privatization of land and therefore of commodification.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Actually one of my favorite passages from Adam Smith is where he gives advice to the new colonies, to the newly liberated colonies, as to how they should pursue sound economics, which is pretty much what the IMF tells the third world today. What he said is the advice was you should concentrate on what was later called comparative advantage, produce agricultural products, you’re good at that, export furs, fish, and so on, but don’t try to produce manufacturing goods, because Britain, England has superior manufacturing goods, so therefore you should import them from England, they’re good at that, you’re good at cotton and corn. Incidentally, the cotton was hardly by free enterprise. And you should certainly not try to monopolize the resources that you have, and if you pursue those practices, then everybody will be better off, economic theory proves that.

Well, the United States happened to be free of English control so therefore they were able to do the opposite, just as England had done. High tariffs to block English goods, enabled them to create a textile industry, the beginning of the industrial revolution. Later in the century a steel industry blocking superior British steel, and right up to the present, as I’ve mentioned, with high tech.

As far as monopolization is concerned, the United States made a major effort to monopolize the basic resource for the early industrial revolution, namely cotton. That’s the oil of the nineteenth century, and the U.S. had most of it, not all of it, and the conquest of Mexico, which was not exactly by free enterprise, was largely undertaken to try to contain, to gain a monopoly of cotton which would overcome the major enemy in those days, which was Britain. Britain was the big force, the enemy, and the Jacksonian presidents, Tyler, Pierce, the mid-nineteenth century, their position was that if we could monopolize cotton, we could bring England to her feet, that way we could really defeat them. Didn’t quite make it, but made a lot. Incidentally, that effort was what Saddam Hussein was charged with in 1990, the charge was ludicrous, but the charge was he was going to try to monopolize oil and bring us all to his feet, which was crazy, but the U.S. try to monopolize cotton and that’s part of the way in which power shifted from England to the United States, and I think that’s a pretty good record of the way sound economics has worked over the years.

There have been places where sound economics was applied, liberal policies. It was called the third world and it’s not an accident. You take a look at the global south. One country developed, Japan, the one colony that was not colonized. Take a look at East Asia, the tigers of East Asia, with one exception, the one that was conquered by the United States, 1898, with a couple hundred thousand people killed and stays semicolonized, not part of the Asian Tiger explosion of industrialization. The pattern is just uniform but somehow hasn’t entered economic theory. I wonder why. You’re an economist.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, the reason why it never entered economic theory is because economics in universities was—began to evolve from the 1950s onwards as the queen of the social sciences, and what gave discursive power and monopoly power within the academic environment to economics was the claim that it was the only social theory which was peddling universal truths to be proven by mathematical means and it succeeded, so when a sociologist, an anthropologist, and an economist applied for a grant, it was always the economist who got it on the basis of this discursive monopoly.

However, in order to close the model mathematically, the only way to solve the equations is by making assumptions that distance the model from really existing capitalism. So for instance you have to assume that there’s no time and there’s no space, because if you allow time to interfere with your model, or space to enter, you end up with indeterminism. In other words, you end up with a system of equations that cannot be solved or that have an infinity of possible solutions and then you have no predictive power. You can’t say, “well, this is what’s going to happen.”

So you have a very interesting inverse Darwinian process. The more successful economists were at creating models that said precisely nothing about capitalism, the greater their success in the academy, so they became the opposite of the public intellectuals that you’ve been writing about. They create wonderful abstractions, aesthetically pleasing models that I spent quite a few years studying in the same way that you go to a museum and you look at a piece of abstract art but you don’t expect to find the truth of capitalism in its form. So this is the interesting sociology of knowledge within the economics profession.

But then there is a parallel shift, the end of Bretton Woods, which unleashed banking. Remember, Roosevelt made sure that in the Bretton Woods Conference, which designed the postwar—the first postwar phase between the 1940s and 1971, 1973. He had stipulated that one kind of person should not be allowed into the Bretton Woods conference. You know who these people were. Bankers. Not one banker attended the Bretton Woods Conference and that was at the explicit order of FDR.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And it showed.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: So you had boring banks between 1944 and 1971, but after 1971 and we can discuss why that is, suddenly banking was unleashed and their capacity effectively to mint private money became unlimited and essential to the second postwar phase of global capitalism, of American capitalism, of American hegemony. During this unleashing there was a need for a theoretical and ideological cover, so I don’t blame my fellow economists for pulling the trigger that created so much devastation in 2008 and before that and after that, but I blame them for providing the economic, the mathematical models, the sermons which steadied the hand of the financiers and allowed them to believe that what they were doing was perfectly okay, consistent with science, provable mathematically that it was riskless, and therefore allowed them the mental and emotional strength to do a lot more damage than they would have done otherwise.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Actually one of the more interesting moments in the history of science and scholarship was actually in 2008. For, as you know, for decades economists had been claiming with extreme arrogance that they completely understood how to control and manage an economy. There were fundamental principles, like the efficient market hypothesis, rational expectations, and anyone who didn’t accept this was dismissed as a kind of a, some strange kind of moron. The whole system collapsed, the whole intellectual edifice collapsed in a most amazing fashion and had no effect on the profession.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: None at all. Well, it did have. It had the effect that sometimes when we’re driving on a freeway, and I usually go well above the speed limit, condemn me if you will, and I get stopped by the police, for the next twenty minutes I drive below the speed limit, but it doesn’t last for more than twenty minutes. After a while, I just go back to where I was. This is exactly like the economics profession. They had a brief moment of—

NOAM CHOMSKY: Some did.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Some, some or at least of being a bit humble and keeping their heads under the parapet for a bit, but then within twenty minutes they forgot about it and they carried on teaching the same rubbish to their students. But what is interesting, Noam, is two small points. It’s not that the economists went headlong into this mathematicized religion, because that’s what it is, a religion with equations and a bit of bad statistics. What happened was two things.

Firstly, there was a kind of ethnic cleansing of anybody that had retained their wits about the economy. So there were economists who challenged this view and who were simply not reproduced by the system. They never got the grants, they never got the PhD students, their PhD students never got lectureships, never got assistant professorships. So there was a purge of this type. The second, which is a far more interesting phenomenon, is that the wonderful minds that created the general equilibrium models, the highest, the popes of the Catholic Church, were not believers. So take for instance Ken Arrow. Ken Arrow is, you know, and Gerard Débreu, they are the ones that, John Nash, they established the mathematical theorems upon which all this hypocrisy is based.

Now, these people, Ken Arrow, I remember in the early 1990s, he was giving a talk at NYU. There were about twenty people. It was a highly mathematized paper. Okay, so he was enthusiastically going through the equations and one of the professors there interrupted him at some point and said, “Professor Arrow, equation 3.3 reminds me of the argument in favor of this kind of taxes opposed to that kind of tax,” and Ken stopped him immediately and said, “My dear boy,” he was a bit condescending, I think rightly so, he said, “You are confusing that which is interesting with that which is useful. (laughter) This is interesting. If you try to apply it to anything real, it is dangerous.”

So the gurus, the popes, understood that this theory was examining a postcapitalist world, a world without labor markets, a world without the, you know, labor exploitation, without monopolies, without even the slightest of capacities to alter prices on the behalf of employers, of entrepreneurs, of conglomerates, a world without firms. Because what is a company? A company is a market-free zone, it’s a hierarchy, it’s a small Soviet Union with Gosplan and central planning. If you look at Google, if you look at Microsoft, that’s what it is.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Then you have Coase’s theorem, that’s a big help.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes, but the Coase’s theorem is taught for five seconds and then forgotten, in order to—to make them feel that they’ve said something about the reason why firms exist. But then in those models that produced the macroeconomic policies that were applied even under Clinton, especially under Clinton, there are no firms, there is no times, no firms, no space, everybody resides at the same point in space, so that there are no costs of transport or anything like that, so imagine a world in which economic policy is predicated upon models that assume there is no time, space, firms, profit, or economic event.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Or monopolies.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s time to get really scared.

NOAM CHOMSKY: You know, there’s a question that I’m sure you know the answer to from your own experience which has kind of puzzled me about contemporary economists. It has to do with the IMF and your experience as Greek finance minister. From what I could see from the outside, it looked as if the IMF economists were pretty harshly criticizing the austerity policies of the troika, but the IMF itself was strongly supporting them. What was going on in there?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, this is exactly what was happening and is happening to this very moment. Wikileaks leaked a wonderful conversation between my old friend Poul Thomsen who made his name by crushing the Greek economy and as a result being promoted to IMF chief in Europe, (laughter) and a Romanian lady going by the name of Delia Velculescu. Read this exchange, just read it, it came out a few weeks ago, Wikileaks, go and look at it. It’s fantastic, because they’re telling the truth, and they’re telling exactly what you’re saying. They are admitting that which they—Poul Thomsen and I had this conversation.

The first time I met the IMF chief in Europe was in a hotel in Paris, and I was elected with a mandate to negotiate a debt write-down for the Greek debt against the troika of lenders, against the wishes of the creditors, but at the same time, because I had a mandate to negotiate, not to clash, with the creditors. I was prepared to clash if I had to, but my intention was not to clash, my intention was to come to an honorable agreement between us. Because I knew that the German government had a very serious political problem going to the federal parliament in Berlin, to the Bundestag, and admitting that the money they had given to the Greeks was not money for the Greeks but for the Deutsche Bank, and therefore that they were never really expecting to get it back, so this is why we are going to give the Greeks a restructure. That’s what Mrs. Merkel should have said to the Bundestag, but of course this is not something she could have said and remained chancellor of Germany.

So I knew that the Germans had a political problem admitting to what they had done, in the sense of having given money to the Greeks so that effectively the German taxpayer and the Slavic taxpayer, because they spread the risk like good financiers do to the other Europeans. Effectively they were bailing out their banks a second time in twelve months. Of course I knew that and I was trying to find a formula that would allow our debt to become more manageable and less toxic for the Greek people while at the same time achieving a kind of political arrangement with Berlin that would make it palatable for them to say yes to it.

So first meeting with Poul Thomsen I come to him with a proposal for a kind of debt swaps, financial engineering, that Wall Street is very good at. Not the kind of thing the one expects from a left-wing minister of finance, but I wanted to make things work at that point, not so much to go and clash with him. Do you know what he said? “This is too mild. We need to take a large chunk of your debt and write it off, immediately.” I said, “Well, that’s music to my ear, Poul. How are you going to convince Wolfgang Schäuble to do this?” “This is a problem, you know, but we’ll find a way.”

So at this level of bilateral discussions even with the leadership of the IMF, you got the idea that they understood what they had done. They knew that they had done a nasty deed. They were subterfuging with what they had done. There was a bailout for banks presented as solidarity to a suffering nation and they were trying to do something about it. But then when it came to the final settlement, as creditors, they stuck to one another, they remained loyal to one another. They spread the rumor that our government was putting forward impossible demands, that we didn’t want to reform, that we had no proposals.

We came to them with financial engineering proposals from Wall Street, they had nothing to suggest except for the signals that they were emitting. But I think that the most important discussion I had was with somebody really high up in the IMF. The name will not be mentioned. Higher up than Poul Thomsen, you can imagine.

(laughter)  

After ten hours of negotiations when we got into the nitty-gritty, these were extremely boring meetings with aides, with advisers, with experts, with committee on pensions and another committee on VAT, in the end we ended up together and we had a discussion, confidential discussion, tête-à-tête. I heard the following words, “Yanis, of course you’re right. These policies we’re trying to impose upon you can’t work.” I thought, “Oh, no.” I don’t know whether you have this. You probably don’t, you’re Noam Chomsky, you wouldn’t. I’m less experienced in this game of clashing with powers that be at that level.

And deep down, if I think, if I psychoanalyze myself, I really wanted to think that the adults know what they are doing, and that I am a child that is recalcitrant, kicking and screaming, but deep down, the adults, the people in power, at the top of the IMF, know what they are doing, and my complaints and protestations, maybe they are not completely accurate. Maybe they know more than I think they do, but when these big people turn around to me and say, “You’re right, it can’t work. What we are trying to impose on your nation can’t work. But, Yanis, you must understand we have invested so much political capital in this program, we can’t go back, and your credibility,” my credibility, “depends on accepting it.” I think that answers your question.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, how do they—how do the participants in the troika deliberations react to the technical papers that are coming out from the IMF economists saying, their own economists, Blanchard, others, saying, these policies of austerity under recession are just destructive.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s very simple. They ignore them.

NOAM CHOMSKY: What do they say?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: In the Eurogroup, these were never mentioned. I mentioned them. I quoted chapter and verse from their own statisticians and economists, like Olivier Blanchard and those people. I quoted. There was also a remarkable study from the IMF showing that the liberalization of labor markets, the removal of the protection of labor, of trade union protection, of trade union rights, protection from unfair dismissal and all that, that that in the end is counterproductive when it comes to competitiveness and productivity. The IMF came out with this in the spring of 2014. A beautiful report. It could have been written by a progressive economist from the New School.

NOAM CHOMSKY: What exactly did it conclude—what did it conclude exactly?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It concluded that these labor market reforms that the IMF had been pushing down the throat of countries from Africa to Asia to Europe, they don’t work, they do not enhance competitiveness, especially when investment is acute. Which is always my argument. So I quoted that as well in the Eurogroup. I might as well have been singing the national anthem of Sweden. (laughter) It was exactly the same thing. Because you’ve got to understand that these meetings are quite brutal. They have already decided what they are going to do. The ministers are treated like vermin by their own minders and by the representatives of the troika. Something very few people know is that the Eurogroup is actually led by the troika, not by the finance ministers, the elected representatives of the nations. So you’ve got the head of the Eurogroup, who is usually, let’s face it, appointed by Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble. Then next to him there is the real ruler of the European Union, a gentleman named Thomas Wieser, nobody’s heard of him, he holds the real power.

NOAM CHOMSKY: What is his position?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: He is the head of the Euro Working Group, which is the cabinet under the Eurogroup.

NOAM CHOMSKY: The nonexistent group.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: They are the shadow cabinet of the nonexistent Eurogroup. And this gentleman has been around now—

NOAM CHOMSKY: How does the Eurogroup get established? You don’t discuss this in your book, you just say it’s there.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: I think it just sprung out, out of the shell like, you know, Aphrodite in Cyprus. (laughter) Look, when we created in our infinite wisdom, a common currency and we had a common central bank but without a state to correspond to this central bank, and with a couple states that did not have a central bank, because that common central bank was created on the proviso that it would not come to the assistance ever of any of the states of which it would be the central bank. They decided that well, every now and then, these finance ministers of these nations that now don’t have a central bank but have created a common central bank should get together and discuss economic policy to coordinate. This is how it emerged. It’s not in any treaty. Do you know how I found that out?

NOAM CHOMSKY: So the Eurogroup consists of the finance ministers?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes, well, that was the initial idea, the finance ministers, and one of them chairs it. Before Dijsselbloem, who is now the president, it was the head of the largest tax haven in the world, Luxembourg, a certain Jean-Claude Juncker.

NOAM CHOMSKY: The United States is getting close.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Not as badly as Luxembourg, not as badly as Luxembourg.

NOAM CHOMSKY: A couple of states are getting there.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s close but not as bad—

NOAM CHOMSKY: Not at that level.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: But ever since this Eurozone, which by the way the euro is a carbon copy of the gold standard of the 1920s. It was created in the image of the gold standard of the 1920s. So you know what happened to the gold standard of the 1920s. It gave rise to the roaring twenties, to immense financialization, immense concentration of industrial power, funded by the consolidation of the financial sector and then Wall Street 1929.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And enormous inequality.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course enormous inequality which is the result of this easy private money minting by the financial sector and when the chickens came home to roost in 1929, the common currency of that era, the gold exchange standard, collapsed, started fragmenting, very soon, the Germans hated the French, the French hated the Germans, everybody hated the Greeks, (laughter) and we descended into the abyss of the 1930s and 1940s.

After our generation’s 1929, which took place in 2008, guess what happened? The gold standard started fragmenting, it was called the euro in Europe, and very soon after that, the Germans started pointing moralizing fingers at the Greeks, the Greeks remembered the Nazi occupation, everybody hated the French, and we are now in a state of disintegration where refugees are the problem.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Actually you should bring up 1953, the London Agreement.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Which most people don’t know about, that’s rather critical maybe you want to say a few words about that?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course. But let me just complete the story about the Eurogroup. I’ll just tell you the story about how the Eurogroup doesn’t exist in law. By the way, one more point, after our country started failing—

NOAM CHOMSKY: Is it inconsistent with European law or just orthogonal to it?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: No, it doesn’t exist in law.

NOAM CHOMSKY: It’s kind of orthogonal, no connection.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s outside the framework of European law.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Now, do its decisions impact—how do its decisions impact—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It makes all the important decisions that determine the future of Europe. Every single one of them.

NOAM CHOMSKY: How are those decisions transmitted to the official decision-making bodies, to the Brussels bureaucracy?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Oh, yes! What happens is first there is the Eurogroup meeting, and then afterwards there is an Ecofin meeting. The Ecofin meeting—Ecofin does exist. It’s the meeting of all the European Union finance ministers, including the ones who are not using the euro. So George Osborne from Britain is there, the Danish finance minister is there, and what happens is it’s a rubber-stamping process. So whatever the Eurogroup has decided, Ecofin says, “okay, we’ll do it.” There is never any debate.

NOAM CHOMSKY: No debate. No debate.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Let me tell you, this is quite interesting. How I came to understand that this is a paralegal group. At some point, the troika inside the Eurogroup, because it’s not just the finance ministers, it’s the IMF, Lagarde is sitting there, Thomsen is sitting there, the European Central Bank is sitting there, the Commission is sitting there, they set the scene and then the vermin, us, the finance ministers, simply nod, happy.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And the IMF has no reaction to the Eurogroup decisions?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, it’s in the Eurogroup, the IMF is part of the Eurogroup. It’s astonishing, isn’t it?

NOAM CHOMSKY: So they’re represented in the Eurogroup.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, let me give you an example. When the ultimatum was presented to me on the 25th of June, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and what that meant was that if I said, “No, I’m leaving it,” our banks would have been closed, as they were, five days later. So that’s a pretty powerful ultimatum, it’s like making me an offer that I can’t refuse, even though we refused it. For a while.

NOAM CHOMSKY: For a while.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Until we caved in and then I resigned. But this is interesting. I was presented with this ultimatum. It comprised three chapters. One was the fiscal policy that we would have to follow for the next twenty years. Interesting. It’s interesting given that our mandate from the Greek people was only for four years.

NOAM CHOMSKY: This is spelled out.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Spelled out. In black and white, what the primary surplus should be, what the tax take should be, what measures we should use, what the VAT rate should be in order to get that primary surplus. Chapter 1. Chapter 2—

NOAM CHOMSKY: And this is specifically for Greece.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Only for Greece.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Has there been something similar for Spain, or Italy?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes. Portugal. This colonization is at full blast. It started with Greece, all bad things start with Greece. (laughter) And then they spread out. Greece is the laboratory of misanthropy.

NOAM CHOMSKY: How do they deal with France?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: France of course is a final destination.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Is that beginning, to give orders to France?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course.

NOAM CHOMSKY: That is. From the Eurogroup.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Noam. The beauty of those five, six months in power. Power. Not, what power. In office—

NOAM CHOMSKY: Watching power.

(laughter/applause)

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: In office. The beauty of it was, you know, we academics all our lives we theorize about things. Okay, we try to get evidence, but we theorize. During those five months I didn’t have to theorize, and to answer your question about France, at some point I was having a very interesting conversation. I had many interesting conversations with the finance minister of Germany, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, at some point when I showed him this ultimatum and I said to him, it’s a long story, but I’ll cut it short.

I said to him, “Would you sign this?” I said, “Let’s take off our hats as finance ministers for a moment. I’ve been in politics for five months. You’ve been in politics for forty years, you keep barking in my ear that I should sign it. Stop telling me what to do. As human beings. You know that my people now are suffering a grave depression. We have children at school who faint as the result of malnutrition. Advise me on what to do, don’t tell me what to do, as somebody with forty years, a Europeanist, somebody who comes from a democratic country, Wolfgang to Yanis, not finance minister to finance minister.”

To his credit, he looked out of the window for a while, and he turned to me and he said—Well, the question that I’d actually asked him was, “Would you sign this?” And he turned around and said, “As a patriot, I wouldn’t.” Of course the next question was, “So why are you forcing me to do it?” He said, “Don’t you understand? I did this in the Baltics, in Portugal, in Ireland, you know. We have discipline to look after, and I want to take the troika to Paris.”

NOAM CHOMSKY: He said that.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes, so I don’t need to theorize. It starts with Greece. Greece is a pipsqueak country, it’s not that important. With that small problem you impose these unsustainable loans, which give creditors huge power and then you start cutting, cutting, cutting, because the final intention, and I try to explain this in this book, is to curtail the Parisian elite’s long-standing ambition to usurp the power of the Deutsche Mark for the purpose of expanding the French nation-state’s reach and control of Europe.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And also I presume for the Bundesbank to be able to control the French budget.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Absolutely, not so much the Bundesbank, but the finance minister himself. And I don’t blame the Germans for that. If you go back to 1992, when the euro was first created, the Maastricht Treaty, to convince the French to vote for it, the French conservative newspaper Le Figaro had a headline that was offensive to human beings. It read, as an encouragement to the French to love the Maastricht Treaty, “Maastrict,” and underneath, “A New Versailles Treaty without a shot being fired.” Now that is offensive to the German people, it is offensive to anyone who understands the pain of the Second World War. It is offense to all well-intentioned human beings.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And do you think French elites actually believed that at Maastricht?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Absolutely. And this was the intention. The goal in 1965, in response to a journalist, who asked him don’t you worry that with this European Economic Union, Germany is going to become the powerful country here, and his response was, “They’re going to be the horse and we are going to be the carriage driver.” It’s clear.

NOAM CHOMSKY: The Brussels bureaucrats.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: The French graduates of the great Grandes Écoles who would be populating the Brussels bureaucracy. We should not be anti-German, anti-French, we just must understand that the elites of Europe have made a complete and utter mess of the project of European union.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Yes but when you get to Maastricht, the French elites still believed that they were controlling German power in the Maastricht Treaty?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes.

NOAM CHOMSKY: That’s pretty astonishing.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s an astonishing error on their part. But so was the German elite’s estimation that—Helmut Kohl for instance, who was a Europeanist, who was a federalist deep down, that you create a currency union first and when it gets in trouble, the political union would follow. What an error. When you create a gold standard and it starts fragmenting, you’re not going to end up with a political union, you’re going to end up with an abyss. You’re going to end up with Le Pen in government in France, the Golden Dawn in Greece, the AfD there in Germany and the fragmentation.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Do you think he understood say Nicholas Kaldor’s prediction?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: He never did.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Never?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: No. None of them did.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Including Kohl?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Including Kohl. He didn’t understand it and he didn’t believe it. He really genuinely thought and in a rather simpleminded manner that we are creating this monetary union. Its fragmentation is going to bring about humungous costs for Europeans, so our successors, when this fragmentation begins, must fix it by creating a political union. Well, yes, they must, but they are not doing it. And they are not doing it because they are falling prey to this self-reinforcing negative feedback mechanism between authoritarianism and bad austerity policies.

NOAM CHOMSKY: How did the Fed respond to Maastricht?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: The Fed?

NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It is interesting. Remember Alan Greenspan was not the most astute of central bankers.

(laughter)

NOAM CHOMSKY: He was in some ways. He understood why the economy was working so well. Remember his testimony to Congress where explained how magnificent the economy was that he was administering. He said it was based on growing worker insecurity.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: True.

NOAM CHOMSKY: That was a good remark.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes, so he was a real class warrior, but he did not understand finance.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Unlike Paul Volcker.

NOAM CHOMSKY: But he understood power.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes, he understood power, but Paul Volcker, his predecessor, understood both power and the pitfalls of overreliance on markets.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah, okay, so what was the reaction to Maastricht by the Fed?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: None.

NOAM CHOMSKY: None? They didn’t pay attention?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yeah, there was—well, I did not know of any substantial reaction. I haven’t seen any, I’ve done some research, they were just going along. They would be making comments about the specifics, technicalities, but not any—Paul Volcker did make some very interesting comments.

NOAM CHOMSKY: What was his reaction?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: All very critical. He was very critical of the lack of checks and balances and shock-absorbing mechanisms. But Alan Greenspan and the Fed under Alan Greenspan indulged in autolobotomy regarding these structural aspects of global capitalism.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Actually I want to bring up the 1953 story. That’s quite critical.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, it’s part of a broader story of American hegemony after the Second World War, which has two dimensions that are of course interwoven. One is the Cold War story, which is a very important story, and the increasing authoritarianism of the United States after Truman.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Beginning with the Truman Doctrine, again, Greece, remember, everything bad starts in Greece, like the Cold War, which began in the streets of Athens in December 1944, not in Berlin, then spread to Berlin, with the first attempts by the CIA, successful attempts, to overthrow governments that they considered inimical to the interests of the global empire. Like the Mosaddegh government, then later our government. I grew up in the dictatorship that the CIA managed to create before the Pentagon had its own coup with the generals.

You know, there was a wonderful race between the Pentagon on the one hand and the CIA as to who was going to stage the Greek coup in 1967 first, and they were working quite separately from one another, the Pentagon with generals and the king, the CIA with the colonels, and the colonels got in first, they were more agile, so they moved in first, then you had Pinochet, you had the Latin American brutality and so on, so that’s one story. We all know about American imperialism post 1944.

But the second dimension, which is much more interesting and much more benign. Because if you look at—it starts with Bretton Woods, an attempt to prevent by the New Dealers in power, and by some very good people, to prevent another Great Depression in the states. The great fear of course was in 1944, they could see that the war would end, they could see that the wonderful factories that were churning out the aircraft carriers, the tanks, the bullets, the jeeps, and so on, even if they were reconfigured to produce white goods and cars and consumer durables, there would not be sufficient demand within America for all those products that these factories could potentially make, so eventually they would scale down investment at a time when the American GIs, the American soldiers would be coming back from the front and that would spear—and they called it “the 1949 moment,” they feared that the 1949—that twenty years after 1929 there would be another crash.

NOAM CHOMSKY: The famous dollar gap.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Exactly. So they sat down and designed a magnificent global plan to prevent this from happening. They also knew—there was the Cold War of course, there was the pressing agenda of making sure that Europe doesn’t fall to the communists and Asia doesn’t fall to the communists, so the two dimensions were combined and the global plan of which the Bretton Woods system was just one part, entailed just to put it as succinctly as I can, the following characteristics and dimensions.

Europe would be dollarized, so that Europeans could buy the gleaming cars and the gleaming aircraft and washing machines from Westinghouse and so on and so forth that America would not be able to absorb on American soil. Europeans were in ashes after the war, so they needed to be dollarized. So they would be allowed to recreate all their own currencies, but their currencies would be pegged to the dollar, effectively they would have the dollar in different form. And that was a fixed-exchange-rate regime.

It was very similar to the gold exchange standard but with a very great difference. The New Dealers who had felt the Great Depression in their bones, most of them, if you look at their biography, had actually suffered during the Great Depression, and they were very keen to avoid it again, understood that what was missing in the gold exchange standard, was a system of surplus recycling, of taking surpluses from jurisdictions where they were being created through a political mechanism and siphoning them in the form of productive investments or some kind of investment into the deficit areas, in order to be able to generate the income in the deficit areas that were necessary to keep purchasing stuff from the surplus countries, so the surplus countries could remain surplus countries, like America for instance. To keep recycling surpluses and deficits to maintain this global plan. If you think about the—This is an extension of the New Deal.

NOAM CHOMSKY: It’s worth bringing out the role of reconstructing Germany—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course. 

NOAM CHOMSKY: —in this system, which was quite critical.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: I have looked at Senate papers from 1946 talking exactly about that, because this global plan had to rely on a European pillar and an Asia pillar, and they had to have a strong European currency and a strong Asian currency to act as shock absorbers. There are these amazing documents where they say, “American capitalism is going to going to go through a spasm like capitalism always does,” that shows a kind of understanding that today on the last twenty years is absent from policymakers. So they could see that there would be a recession.

And the question that we’re asking, if we only have one currency after the war, because Europe was destroyed and we would be dollarizing them. If we only had the dollar, any crisis in the dollar zone, in America, would be transmitted very quickly both to Asia and Europe and maybe those shocks would be magnified instead of being dampened. So we need shock absorbers, we need the European currency and the Asian currency that would do the shock absorbing. But in order for those currencies to be sufficiently strong they would have to have—

NOAM CHOMSKY: They’d have to be subordinate—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Industry. Industry.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And crucially subordinate to the dollar. Not—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Exactly. Exactly. So they would have to be net exporters in their vicinity. Germany within the rest of Europe, Japan within China.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Within the global system managed and run—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Within the global system under the tutelage—

NOAM CHOMSKY: That’s the Keynes/White dispute.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: The Battle of Bretton Woods, which is an amazing episode in intellectual and financial history. At that point the problem they had when they were thinking about this in 1946, late ’45, early ’46, is they already had agreed with the French to turn Germany into a pastoral land, to deindustrialize Germany. So they had to go back to the French and say, “We changed our minds,” and they did, and they offered them a bargain. “You will agree to the reindustrialization of Germany. You will agree to a write-down of German debt, otherwise the German economy will never be able to recover if it is in a dark cloud of unsustainable debt. And in return what we’re going to give you is the leadership of Europe.” This is the goal idea, that they are the drivers of the carriage and Germany is the horse that powers it, and indeed this is what happened. If you think of—where is the OECD? It’s in Paris. What is the OECD? The OECD is a relic of the Marshall Plan. So the French were distributing Marshall aid in Europe. Think about Brussels. Brussels was completely and utterly designed by the French elite.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Yeah.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Think about the IMF. Why is Christine Legarde the managing director of the IMF? Why was Strauss-Kahn the manager —this is still the relic, the leftover of this deal with the French and the Germans. Interestingly, so going to ’53. Fifty-three is where the Americans grabbed the heads of the British, of the French, of the Italians, and of the Greeks, incidentally, and banged them together and said, “You are going to write down German debt.” So Greece was owed money by Germany that it throws off so that Germany could reindustrialize in the 1950s.

NOAM CHOMSKY: And that illustrates the title of your book. The French got something in return, the Greeks didn’t, the weak suffer as they must.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Yes, indeed. But of course I always like to leave a degree of optimism hanging in the air (laughter) so you may have noticed that my book ends with—the title ends with a question mark, and the emphasis is on the question mark and the dedication is to my mother and it says that my mother would have slaughtered with immense kindness anyone who dared say that the weak suffered what they must. And even the original expression comes from Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War, when he recounts as an Athenian—remember, Thucydides is an Athenian historian and soldier and general who is recounting the story of when Athens sent a fleet with troops, the marines, the Athenian marines, to the island of Melos to crash the local society, the local city-state. Why? Because Melos refused to take sides in the cold war, or actually the hot war at the time, between Athens and Sparta. And Athens had its own NATO in the archipelago of the Aegean and it was very worried that if the Melians were allowed to be independent, then the rest might get ideas that they want to exit NATO, the NATO of the time, so they sent the troops to crush them. And there is this interesting meeting when the Athenian generals meet the Melian representatives, delegates to announce to them, but you know, your life is over, surrender quietly and we will sell you as slaves. If you resist, we are going to crush you. And the Melians gave them a Kantian argument that you should never treat human beings as a means to an end, you should treat them as an ends in themselves. Not exactly but more or less this.

NOAM CHOMSKY: They hadn’t read Kant yet, remember.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Of course, but it was more or less that kind of Kantian argument. You should treat those in a position of weakness in the same way you would want to be treated in a position of weakness, because one day you will be in a position of weakness, as of course the Athenians of course did become—

NOAM CHOMSKY: Very soon.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Shortly afterwards when they lost the war to Sparta, and the Athenian general responded, no, you’ve got it just wrong, the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. But Thucydides is telling us this story in order to allow us to criticize it. Thus the question.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, I think the real optimistic element in the book is the Condorcet quote about power really being in the hands of the masses if they take it.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: In the mind of the masses.

NOAM CHOMSKY: In the mind, and in fact that goes back to and he was probably quoting David Hume, who in “The First Principles of Government” makes that point very clearly. He says it’s surprising to see the easiness with which the great mass of the population is subordinate to their governors, because power is in the hands of the governed, and if we inquire into the means by which this wonder is achieved we see that it is by consent alone that the powerful are able to govern. Meaning that if the governed refused to consent, to use your words, the game is over.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: That’s exactly right. That’s exactly right. And I and Danae, my wife, we felt that on the third of July last year. And that was a magnificent moment. Because you’ve got to remember our government won the election in January 2015 with a mandate to speak truth to the powerful, to say no to them and, “do your worst, we are not accepting any more of your toxic loans under conditions that will shrink our economy and our people further.” And we won this election, but because of the system of disproportional representation, we won government with 36 percent of the vote. The previous governing party received something like 25 percent, so we had enough seats in parliament to form a government, but that’s 36 percent of the vote, and we had the whole media of Greece and the world completely and utterly, militantly against us.

We had the central bank, third day I was in my office, the president of the Eurogroup visited me to say, “Either you accept the existing policies,” the ones we were elected to challenge, “or your banks will be closed within a month.” So this is the—you can’t be weaker than that. We did have a strategy, we did have a secret weapon, we can talk about this later when we open this up, but when they closed our banks down, I believed that it was just a matter of days before our support would wane. And we had called for a referendum to support us to carry on fighting.

So remember, we had only won 36 percent. The banks were closed, people didn’t have access to their money. Pensioners were fainting in line in front of closed banks to get some money out in order to feed themselves. The press is bombarding, terrorizing people in their living rooms on their television sets, saying to them that if they went with us against the troika, Armageddon is going to come, and we’ll be expelled from the universe, not just Europe. (laughter) And those crazy, magnificent Greeks gave us 62 percent. Why? Because the one deficit they could not bear was the deficit of dignity. And they had a Condorcet moment.

(applause)

NOAM CHOMSKY: So what happens to Greece now?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, unfortunately, that very night of the referendum, our government, my prime minister, surrendered.

NOAM CHOMSKY: But now.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, to answer your question. That surrender meant that that we have the worst possible combination. We have a neoliberal ideology with completely anti-neoliberal policies. They increased the corporate tax rate, they increased the VAT rate, they increased the income tax rate, they reduced pensions, they reduced wages. So they did—

NOAM CHOMSKY: Even harsher conditions than the ones you refused.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Even harsher conditions. The Greek economy is fading, all business plans are going haywire, in a sense remember “liquidate, liquidate, liquidate” under President Hoover, Mellon, I think was the name of the U.S. treasury secretary that said that. That is what’s happening. Complete liquidation of Greek business, the Greek state, and the Greek people. And all that is happening in the context of the nineteenth-century gunboat diplomacy, the purpose of which is not so much Greece, it is how to keep France, Spain, Portugal.

After my prime minister’s surrender on the 13th of July, he signed the document of surrender, and you know what happened, the Spanish right-wing prime minister came out of the room wielding this document like this in front of the cameras, and speaking in Spanish to the Spanish media he said, “this is what you get if you vote for the Syriza of Spain,” for Podemos.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Podemos.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, thankfully, the Spanish voted him out but didn’t vote Podemos in, so they now have a hand parliament in Spain, no government.

NOAM CHOMSKY: No government.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, actually that’s much better than having that government.

NOAM CHOMSKY: So what do you think the future is for the peripheral—when you say “liquidate,” do you mean liquidate into German hands primarily?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: No what I mean is, what’s going to happen is there’s going to have hundreds of thousands of small businesses, people who will lose their shops, they will lose their pharmacies, they will become homeless, they will leave the country, with their kids, who are well educated, they will go to Germany, they will go to Spain—Spain, no, because the Spaniards are leaving—they will come here, they will go Canada, they will go to Australia, they will go to South America, somewhere to find a way of making ends meet. You are going to have the liquidation of households with foreclosures and foreclosures in Greece are worse than here, because here you can take the keys to your house and go to the bank and say, “Take it. Bye.” In Greece, you can’t do that. Even if you lose your house, you still have the debt, you carry it with you, like Mephistopheles walking around with hell around him, you are walking around the world with that same debt, even though you no longer have the house.

NOAM CHOMSKY: It’s kind of like student debt here.

(applause)

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Exactly. So in answer to your question, what is now the prospect of progressive politics and of hope in Greece? I think that now we had a window of opportunity in Greece to reboot this loan agreement and to reboot Europe, because had we succeeded there, then it would have really spread to Spain and to Italy and throughout the rest of Europe, we missed that. This is why I and some other utopians and recalcitrants throughout Europe, we have created what we call DiEM, the Democracy in Europe Movement, with our manifesto that Noam Chomsky signed, making me the happiest person in Europe.

(applause)

For the same very simple reason, I think we are in a 1930 moment. Shortly after the collapse of Wall Street, the great financial crisis, and just before the slide into a postmodern abyss of xenophobia, misanthropy, failed economic policies, austerity, debt deflation that will become a major source of uncertainty, of misanthropy, of pain and unnecessary not just for Europe but for the rest of the world. Allow me at this point, I have a pin that I’ve brought with me for DiEM to give to you which I am wearing, and this is a bit of propaganda for our Democracy in Europe Movement, and I can’t not give this to Noam Chomsky since he signed our manifesto.

(applause)

NOAM CHOMSKY: Thank you very much.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: And I’m being signaled to that we have to open this up to Q and A.

NOAM CHOMSKY: It’s a good point, good point.

Q: Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Varoufakis my question is about European integration policy, the then and now. We know that in 1992 the leaders of the day signed the Maastricht Treaty, which stipulated those convergence criteria to measure well, I guess, the similarity between economies such that if they were able to fulfill those criteria, they qualified for the initial round of euro membership. Are EU policymakers only looking at those criteria now, those deficit criteria, or are they looking at other measures of integration given what we know about what’s—is that their only policy focus?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Well, let me say that they never looked at those criteria. These were bogus criteria. Greece didn’t meet those criteria. Italy didn’t meet those criteria. Far from it. The criterion was 60 percent of debt over GDP as a maximum. Italy had 100 percent. But of course the whole point of creating the Eurozone was in order to stop Fiat producing cars that would remain competitive vis-à-vis Volkswagens through devaluation of the lira. So they needed Italy, so they violated their own criteria. They just ignored them, and they brought Italy, Greece in. And you know how Greece got in? We had some smart people in the finance ministry, in the central bank of Greece, and they copied exactly the same tricks that they used to let Italy in. They said, “Well, we know what you’ve been up to. So if you let Italy in, we were doing the same tricks, we will present the same data, so either you have to kick the Italians out or allow us in as well.” So this is how we got caught up.

You’ve got to understand that it’s a very hypocritical concept, the whole thing, the whole process, so it was never a question of integration, really. It was a question of expanding the limits of predatory financialization. What did Greece have to offer the Eurozone? Can I tell what we had? We had no oil, we had really—we were not a traditional colony that had natural resources to—what we brought to the Eurozone was a population with minimal debt and a lot of equity. Because Greeks loathe debt. My parents’ generation didn’t have credit cards, personal loans, mortgages. They worked for thirty years, put some money aside, borrowed some money from an aunt or an uncle and bought a house, okay? So we were a dream come true for German and French bankers. We had a Protestant almost ethic in terms of debt, and there was very little debt. And a capacity, once extended, once the Deutsche Mark was extended to Greece, okay, we had the capacity to borrow and borrow and borrow on the basis of very sound collateral.

So this edifice was never designed to sustain an economic crisis. You know which were the two countries that violated the Maastricht criteria first, before anybody else? Germany and France. So these rules were written not to be respected, but were written to be used as a club by which to beat the weak and the ones who dare speak out against the irrationality of the system.

Q: Thank you.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Thank you.

(applause)

 Q: Hello. My question is for Mr. Chomsky. In the past you’ve been very critical of the way in which the West has engaged in political and economic imperialism around the world behind closed doors, kind of smoke and mirrors. How do you believe that transparency and democratizing the Eurozone—

NOAM CHOMSKY: And democratizing the Eurozone.

Q: How it will kind of affect or possibly deter this behavior?

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, actually one of the things that Yanis discusses in his book is that the Eurozone—in the Eurozone, democracy has declined arguably even faster than it has in the United States. During this past generation of neoliberal policies there has been a global assault on democracy, that’s kind of inherent in the principles. And in the Eurozone it’s reached a remarkable level. I mean, even the Wall Street Journal, hardly a critical rag, (laughter) pointed out that no matter who gets elected in a European country, whether it’s communist, fascist, anybody else, the policies remain the same. And the reason is they’re all set in Brussels, by the bureaucracy, and the citizens of the national states have no role in this, and when they try to have a role, as in the Greek referendum, they get smashed down. That’s a rare step. Mostly they are sitting by passively as victims of policies over which they have nothing to say, and what Yanis said about the Eurogroup is quite striking. This is a completely unelected work group. Not in any remote way related to citizens’ decisions, but it’s basically making the decisions, the choices and decisions. That’s even beyond what happens here. Here it’s bad enough, but that’s more extreme.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Let me add to this just to clarify something. Actually I will go further than Noam about Europe. The European Union doesn’t suffer or the Eurogroup from a democratic deficit. It’s like saying that we are on the moon and there is an oxygen deficit. There is no oxygen deficit on the moon. There is no oxygen, full stop. (laughter)And this is official in Europe.

At my first Eurogroup, as the rookie around, I was given the floor to set out our policies and to introduce myself, which is nice, and I gave the most moderate speech that I thought it was humanly possible to make. I said, “I know that you are annoyed I’m here. Your favorite guy didn’t get elected, I got elected, I’m here, but I’m here in order to work with you, to find common ground, there is a failed program that you want to keep insisting on implementing in Greece, we have our mandate, let’s sit down and find common ground.” I thought that was a pretty moderate thing to say. They didn’t.

And then after me, after I had expounded the principle of continuity and the principle of democracy, and the idea of having some compromise between the two, Doctor Wolfgang Schäuble puts his name tag forward and demands the floor and he comes up with a magnificent statement, verbatim I’m going to give you what he said, “Elections cannot be allowed to change the economic policies of any country.” (laughter) At which point I intervened and said, “this is the greatest gift to the Communist Party of China, because they believe that too.” (laughter)

Now, while I was in there at the twelve Eurogroup meetings that I attended before I resigned, I noticed in those very lengthy, incredibly intense and depressing sequences of discussions, some of them lasted more than twelve hours. The room was full of cameras, microphones, you know, these screens, we had thirty of them, we were in the same room with people and I was watching them on television. Because, you know, this is the power of the screen. You don’t watch the person speaking, you watch him on the screen, or her. Yeah?

And at some point it hit me, “We don’t need a revolution here, somebody in the control booth just press a button and connect all these cameras to the Internet.” Just imagine if that were to happen, huh? You don’t need a treaty change, a constitution, a revolution, nothing. Somebody just press a button, like in a science fiction movie, you press a button and suddenly have a new universe. What would happen? Would Schäuble say this? I don’t know, maybe he would, but you know what, it would make a difference for the Germans, the French, the Portuguese, to hear him say those words, instead of reading the Financial Times where people like Peter Spiegel were simply saying that Yanis Varoufakis was resisting reform in his country and he demanded more money for it. So transparency is everything. It’s a first step. It’s a huge revolutionary step that takes nothing more than the press of a button so this is why on our side again, I’m a salesperson here tonight.

In DiEM25.org, there’s a transparency in Europe now campaign where we’re demanding the livestreaming of all these meetings. We’re demanding that the ECB publishes its minutes. (applause) We’re demanding that all the TTIP negotiating. Do you know that as the minister of state for finance in Greece in order to look at the TTIP documents of the negotiations between the European Union to which I was a finance minister and the United States I had to sign a nondisclosure agreement? In other words, the price of looking at those documents was that I promised not to tell my electorate. So if you can, get into our site and sign the petition for transparency. It’s a small step, just to make it difficult for them. Even if they have to answer the question why are they not livestreaming the meetings, that’s a small step, because you are putting them in a difficult position.

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: I just want to say that we are also livestreaming, (laughter)and that I’m not going to tell you how many questions we’re going to take, but we’re going to end at 8:59, so next question.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: 8:59, you and your precision.

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: 9:01.

Q: Hi, it’s a little bit follow-up question to the previous one to Varoufakis. You wrote that Wolfgang Schäuble wants to kind of have a superminister of all of the Eurozone. Nonelected, will just kind of decide on national—that’s his plan. But I’m just wondering what do you propose instead because sometimes it’s a bit unclear to me if you also want kind of a superminister, just an elected one, or if you want more power taken back to the national countries? And also—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: You have a second question?

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: Just one question.

Q: But also just that Eurozone, if you want to keep the euro in the long term or if it should be maybe slowly—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: It’s the same question.

Q: Yes.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Let me be brief. What Schäuble wants and I know that because he’s written about it and we’ve discussed it, is a semblance of federation where the Eurogroup becomes a—he doesn’t feel good that it’s not legal. He wants to legalize it. And he wants to turn the president of the Eurogroup the fiscal leviathan of the Eurozone. He doesn’t call him that, but he wants him to be if you want the fiscal representative of—or the treasurer, the treasurer of the Eurozone. But he wants to give this person a tiny little budget, tiny federal budget, 1 percent of GDP, nothing, in other words, and the main function of this person will be to have a veto power over national budgets.

Now this is a monstrous notion. Let me give you an example. On the one hand you have a parliament, the French National Assembly, voting in a budget. OK? The budget of the French government is 50 percent of GDP; half of the economy of France is controlled by the state. Now you’re going to have a fiscal overlord in Europe, that has a 1 percent budget, in other words has absolutely no capacity to affect surplus recycling within Europe and stabilize European capitalism, but he is going to have—I was going to say he or she but we know it’s going to be a he, don’t we? He is going to have the right to veto the budget that National Assembly of France voted. And why? To keep countries within the fiscal constraints of the Maastricht Treaty, which has so spectacularly and abundantly failed.

And let me give you an example of why this is just mad, and makes absolutely no sense, even from a neoliberal perspective. Take Ireland, Ireland before 2008 was the blue-eyed boy or girl of the international neoliberal Washington consensus. They had turned their markets so elastic that they, you know, they resembled the circus. They had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 25 percent. Half that of Germany. They were never above budget, they had a surplus, actually they had a surplus in their, they call it their federal budget, I call it their state budget. So they were the model country, the model citizen of the neoliberal mantra, okay?

Now, of course, if you look at what was happening in the private sector, they had gone crazy with, there was a frenzy of indebtedness like here in Wall Street and so on and so forth. The moment the credit crunch begun after Lehman Brothers, the developers went bust, the developers’ loans to the Anglo-Irish Bank and the various other shady banks in Ireland went bad, they became nonperforming, those banks immediately became insolvent, and then the president of the Central Bank, a certain Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, called the Irish prime minister, “transfer all the losses of the private sector onto the public books, onto the taxpayers, or else, or I will close down your banks.” Remember that happened to me a few years later too. And at that point suddenly Irish publish debt went from 25 percent to 120 percent.

Now, what would the fiscal overlord do then? Nothing. Would he veto this? No, because it was the Central Bank’s direct directive that pushed all the losses of the private sector onto the taxpayer. So this system that Dr. Schäuble is proposing is just an attempt to legitimize the illegitimate current informal system. It has absolutely no capacity to stabilize European capitalism. The only thing it will do, it will formalize the current impasse.

You’re asking me what I want. I would like a federal democracy. I would like a European parliament, I would like a federal government with a substantial budget and proper surplus recycling and I would like to have a European Union constitution that is fifteen, twenty pages and not written by a failed former president of France that scripts the preface, that happened 2005, beginning with the rights of capital. You knew that one, didn’t you? That there was an attempt to write the European Union that began, the preface, the bill of rights was all about the rights of capital. You can’t make it up.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Schäuble’s comment about elections.

Q: Hi, first of all, I’m very honored to be here in front of both of you. I wanted to ask a quick question for Yanis. To what extent do you agree with the notion that the Greek government was caught in a tragic circumstance, and they did what their options allowed them to do at the time, given that the other option might have been an exit from the euro combined with the refugee crisis that they have now. And for Mr. Chomsky, I wanted to ask a little bit your evaluation on the Bernie Sanders phenomenon in American politics and how do you evaluate that for the future of American politics?

NOAM CHOMSKY: Sorry, say it again?

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Bernie Sanders.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Oh, Bernie.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: Bernie. You start with Bernie.

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, Bernie Sanders is an extremely interesting phenomenon. He’s a decent, honest person. It’s pretty unusual in the political system. (laughter) Maybe there are two of them in the world. (applause) But he’s considered a radical, an extremist, which is a pretty interesting characterization, because he’s basically a mainstream New Deal Democrat. His positions would not have surprised President Eisenhower, who said, in fact, that anyone who does not accept New Deal programs doesn’t belong in the American political system. That’s now considered very radical.

The other interesting aspect of Sanders’s positions is that they’re quite strongly supported by the general public and have been for a long time. That’s true on taxes, it’s true on health care. So take, say, health care. His proposal for a national health care system, meaning the kind of system that just about every other developed country has, at half the per capita cost of the United States and comparable or better outcomes. That’s considered very radical, but it’s been the position of the majority of the American population for a long time. So if you go back say to the Reagan—Right now, for example, latest polls about 60 percent of the American population favor it.

When Obama put forward the Affordable Care Act, there was you recall a public option, but that was dropped. It was dropped even though it was supported by about almost two thirds of the population. You go back earlier, say to the Reagan years, about 70 percent of the population thought that national health care should be in the constitution because it’s such an obvious right, and in fact about 40 percent of the population thought it was in the constitution, (laughter) again because it’s such an obvious right. And the same is true on tax policy and others.

So we have this phenomenon where someone is taking positions that would have been considered pretty mainstream during the Eisenhower years, that are supported by a large part or from a considerable majority of the population, but he’s dismissed as radical and extremist. That’s an indication of how the spectrum has shifted to the right during the neoliberal period, so far to the right that the contemporary Democrats are pretty much what used to be called moderate Republicans. And the Republicans are just off the spectrum. (laughter) They’re not a legitimate parliamentary party anymore.

And Sanders has the—significant part of the—he has pressed the mainstream Democrats a little bit towards the progressive side. You see that in Clinton’s statements. But he has mobilized a large number of young people. These young people who are saying, “look, we’re not going to consent anymore,” and if that turns into a continuing organized mobilized, mobilized force, that could change the country. Maybe not for this election but in the longer term.

(applause)

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: I’m going to answer your question by saying, and I hope you don’t consider this to be too harsh a judgment of your question. I will say that embedded in your question is the most toxic form of TINA, of the proposition that there is no alternative. The idea that in the end we had to surrender because the alternative would be worse effectively denigrates the 62 percent of Greeks who ordered us not to surrender. And it denigrates those of us who actually won government, because if what you said is right, we wouldn’t leave. We walked in there and thought that with the power of our rationality and the force of our personality we would convince the troika of lenders to be kind to us, we were relying on the kindness of creditors. No, we were not naïve. From 2012 to 2013 I had long conversations with our team, the team that eventually became the negotiating team, the government, the inner cabinet, the war cabinet as we called it, and we were talking about how are we going to respond to the threat of bank closures that would happen on the first day of our government. And we had worked out a plan of what our retaliation would be. I won’t bore you know, we don’t have the time, I have spoken about this extensively, we would have to haircut the bonds that the ECB held that were in Greek law. It was perfectly simple to do it and we would not end up as Argentina because it was Greek law, the ECB would have to come to a Greek court to contest it, they would not be dragging us to Luxembourg to London or to New York and that would have crippled QE, it would have brought down with a very high probability the euro, so if they closed down our banks, we had a weapon by which to retaliate. We were planning a parallel payment system in case the banking system was in disrepair, could not be used for transaction.

We had that agreement. It’s the only reason I stood in front of the Greek people and asked them to vote me in. I didn’t ask them to do this in order for me to go in there and go in to the Eurogroup and give nice speeches and hope for the best. And we did not see this through. To say that it was inevitable that we would surrender and that the alternative would be worse is effectively to confirm that there is no alternative to barbarism, and I shall not confirm this.

Q: Thank you.

(applause)

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: If this would be okay for you, may I suggest that we take, we bundle three questions together and so you ask three brief questions, you ask one question, you ask one question, and that gentleman there asks one question, and the others of you there I applaud you for being so hopeful.

(laughter)

Q: Thank you very much for this conversation and I would like to ask my question to both of you. You have discussed the situation in Spain and we have just found today that after four months without being able to form a government there will be new general elections on the 26th of June so my question would be which would be your message in this critical juncture in the battle of ideas in Europe for the Spanish people and also for Podemos? Thank you.

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: Question number 1. Question number 2?

Q: Yes, thank you for a fascinating evening. Austerity is bankrupt. It’s bankrupt empirically, it’s bankrupt intellectually, it continues to be imposed on the people of Europe. You have framed this tonight as primarily a political conflict, primarily between Germany and France. Can’t we interpret this as an agenda by people who have no particular political or national allegiances to impose Reagan- and Thatcher-style capitalism on the core of Europe, including Germany, what happens to German pensions at the end of this game?

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: And the last question.

Q: My question was concerning some of the other peripheral countries in Europe—Ireland, Spain, and Italy and their national governments did not support you last year during the crisis. Now would you comment on that and also what do you think the prospects for those countries are now, economically?

NOAM CHOMSKY: Well, the message for the people of Spain I think should be this,(applause) that’s what they should be voting for, and they can achieve it. Go back to David Hume. Power is in the hands of the people if they don’t consent, and that’s critical.

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: I have nothing to add to this. I’ll try to combine with the last question, because what applies to the people of Spain applies to the people of Italy, to the people of France but indeed also to the people of Germany, and that brings us to the other question as well. We’re in it together.

The notion that Europe is split between north and south and that north is populated by all the ants whereas the grasshoppers have congregated to the south and to Ireland is a very strange idea. There are ants and there are grasshoppers everywhere. What happened before 2008 was the grasshoppers of the south and the grasshoppers of the north got together into a splendid alliance of debt-driven frenzy. They were the bankers. They were the spivs, they were those who predicated their growth on transfers from the European Union budget to create motorways that went to nowhere, Olympic Game sites in Greece, and so on and so forth, and they became fabulously rich. This was the alliance of the grasshoppers. The ants were working very hard and were finding it very hard to make ends meet during the good times. And then when the grasshoppers’ empire collapsed, it was the ants of the north and the ants of the south that had to bail them out, and it’s time for the ants of the north and the ants of the south to unite in Europe to change that crazy regime.

(applause)

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: Any final words?

NOAM CHOMSKY: I think—

YANIS VAROUFAKIS: I want to pay my respects to this institution, and I want to thank you and to your staff—I met some of them before—for the diligence and the dedication and the enthusiasm. If only our rulers had a modicum, a percentage, a small percentage to public service, the world would have been a much better place.

PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER: Continue, continue a little more. (laughter) Thank you very much!

(applause)

 

Julio Quesada sobre el nazismo en Heidegger y sus conexiones con el presente del nacionalismo étnico

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Nazismo y Filosofía: audio entrevsita sobre los Cuadernos Negros, de M. Heidegger ( en español, sobre el libro , vol.I en español, Ed Trotta)http://www.filosofiahoy.es/index.php/mod.pags/mem.detalle/relcategoria.5897/idpag.6928/prev.true/chk.9d2b99f076c320861a0830c9bd0ba72a.html

Sócrates visto por I F Stone

Introfilosofia's Blog

LECTURAS DE UN FILÓSOFO

INICIO
lunes, 23 de septiembre de 2013
El juicio de Sócrates. I. F. Stone.
I. F. STONE, El juicio de Sócrates,
Trad. Mª Teresa Fernández de Castro, Mondadori, Madrid, 1988. (297 pp.)

Alcibíades recibiendo las lecciones de Sócrates. François André Vincent (1777).
Fuente (Wikipedia)
Esta es la primera de una serie de entradas del blog que van a estar dedicadas a la figura de Sócrates. En este primer post nos acercamos a la obra de I. F. Stone que tiene como título El juicio de Sócrates. Se trata de un libro de lectura amena y fluida en el que el autor lleva a cabo un análisis de los motivos que llevaron a la ciudad de Atenas, la cuna de la libertad de expresión, a condenar a uno de sus filósofos más famosos por hacer uso de ese derecho. La tesis del libro es clara y puede…

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